University of South Florida

Digital Commons @ University of South Florida
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

November 2021

Human-centric Cybersecurity Research: From Trapping the Bad
Guys to Helping the Good Ones
Armin Ziaie Tabari
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Ziaie Tabari, Armin, "Human-centric Cybersecurity Research: From Trapping the Bad Guys to Helping the
Good Ones" (2021). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/etd/9277

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Digital Commons @
University of South Florida. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of South Florida. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Human-centric Cybersecurity Research: From Trapping
the Bad Guys to Helping the Good Ones

by

Armin Ziaie Tabari

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida

Major Professor: Xinming Ou, Ph.D.
Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.
Mehran Mozaffari Kermani, Ph.D.
Nasir Ghani, Ph.D.
Raj Rajagopalan, Ph.D.

Date of Approval:
November 8, 2021

Keywords: Internet of Things, Honeypot, Secure Software Development, Anthropology,
Ethnography
Copyright © 2021, Armin Ziaie Tabari

Dedication
This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my family. There is an especially great sense
of gratitude for my loving parents, Dr. Aram Ziaee Tabari and Taraneh Badiee Bahnamiri,
whose words of encouragement and commitment to tenacity echo in my ears. It would
have been impossible for me to complete my doctoral studies without their endless love and
encouragement. I appreciate all that you have done for me, and I love you both.
This dissertation is also dedicated to my brothers, Ali and Ramin, who have always been
there for me and have supported me throughout the entire process. I am thankful to them,
for being my friend, my guidance, and my pillars of strength throughout my journey. I am
also grateful to my sister-in-law, Manijeh, for all her kindness and love. I’m grateful for my
beloved niece, Vanda for all the love she borough to our lives.
My family has always been by my side through thick and thin and I dedicate this work
to them. You are my world.

Acknowledgments
First, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Xinming Ou for all
the support and encouragement during my Ph.D. study. I learned from him how to handle
research difficulties and enhance my capabilities to be a better researcher and engineer. He
is an excellent researcher, inspiring advisor and a perfect mentor that every graduate student
would like to work with.
I would like to thank my dissertation committe members, Dr. Jay Ligatti, Dr. Mehran
Mozaffari Kermani, Dr. Nasir Ghani and Dr. Raj Rajagopalan for their guidance and valuable
advice toward completion of this work. In addition, I wish to thank Dr. Daniel Lende for
his guidance and critical contributions to the success of our ethnographic study.
Additionally, I am so grateful for my love, Farzaneh. She has constantly encouraged,
motivated, and supported my every step of the way.
At last, I would like to thank my fellow Argus Lab members for the many memorable
times and fruitful discussions.
This work was supported in part by the U.S. National Science Foundation under Grant
No. 1801633 and 1638301, U.S. National Security Agency, Cyber Florida and U.S Office of
Naval Research.

Table of Contents

List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

v

Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

Chapter 1: Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

Chapter 2: MPMFPot – Multi-phased Multi-faceted IoT Honeypot Framework
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 An Introduction to Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Honeypots for General Purposes . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.2 Honeypots for Internet of Things . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Honeypot Related Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

3
3
5
6
8
10
12

Chapter 3: MPMFPot Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 IoT Honeypot Framework Design – The First Step . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Layer 1 – Multi-Phased Multi-Faceted Low-Interaction Ecosystem
3.2.1 Honeypot Server Farms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1.1 Off-the-shelf Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1.2 HoneyCamera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2 Honeypot Vetting Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.3 Data Analytics Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Layer 2 – Internet of Things Laboratory and ProxyPot . . . . . .
3.3.1 Internet of Things Laboratory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.2 ProxyPot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

13
13
15
16
18
19
21
21
22
22
24
25

Chapter 4:
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

26
26
28
28
29

Chapter 5: Analysis of Honeypot Logs – A Clustering Approach . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Clustering of Captured Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.1 Similarity Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31
31
31

Multi-faceted and Multi-phased Deployment/Experimentation
HoneyShell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HoneyWindowsBox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HoneyCamera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

i

5.1.2 Clustering Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Identifying Common Patterns Behind Attacker Intentions . . . . . . .
Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32
34
35

Experimentation and Data Analysis . . . . . .
HoneyShell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HoneyWindowsBox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
HoneyCamera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experimentation on the Clustering Algorithm
Experimentation on the Grouping Algorithm .
Chapter Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

36
36
39
40
44
47
49

Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

Chapter 8: A Co-Creation Models to Improve the Software Development Process
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52
52
53

Chapter 9:
9.1
9.2
9.3

5.2
5.3
Chapter 6:
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6

Research Methods and Context . . . . . .
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Data Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.1 The Company and Its Products
9.3.2 Development Process . . . . . .
9.3.3 Study Participants . . . . . . .
9.3.4 Research Ethics . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

56
56
57
58
58
59
60
60

Chapter 10: Live Discovery through Pen-testing during Ethnography
10.1 Penetration Testing Method Adopted for This Study . .
10.2 Exploring Software Vulnerabilities Found . . . . . . . . .
10.3 Behaviors and Reactions from Developers . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

62
62
64
65

Chapter 11: Analyzing the Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11.1 Developers Should Not Totally Trust Programming Languages
11.2 Outsider vs. Insider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11.3 Thinking as an Attacker, Thinking as a Developer . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.

71
71
72
74

Chapter 12: Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

References

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

Appendix A: Copyright Permissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

Appendix B: Institutional Review Boards (IRB) Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

Appendix C: Clusters Identified from Honeypot Logs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93
ii

Appendix D: Coding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.1 Full Set of Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D.2 Final Collaborative Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95
95
97

iii

List of Tables

Table 3.1

List IoT Devices Installed in the Layer 2 of MPMFPot Framework

.

24

Table 6.1

Number of Hits Based on Different Honeypot Facets . . . . . . . . . .

36

Table 6.2

Top 10 Username and Password Combinations – HoneyShell . . . . .

38

Table 6.3

Categorization of Downloaded Files – HoneyShell . . . . . . . . . . .

39

Table 6.4

Top 10 Commands Executed – HoneyShell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

Table 6.5

Attack Types Executed – HoneyCamera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

Table 6.6

Top 10 Username Used – HoneyCamera

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

Table 6.7

Top 10 Password Used – HoneyCamera . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

iv

List of Figures

Figure 3.1 MPMFPot Framework Architectural View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

Figure 3.2 Multi-phased Multi-faceted Honeypot Ecosystem . . . . . . . . . . .

16

Figure 3.3 Honeypot Deployment Locations For Server Farms . . . . . . . . . .

18

Figure 3.4 HoneyCamera Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20

Figure 3.5 IoT Laboratory Diagrams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

Figure 3.6 An Overview of ProxyPot Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Figure 6.1 Hits per Location/Phase – HoneyShell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Figure 6.2 Top 10 Countries with the Most Connections – HoneyShell . . . . . .

37

Figure 6.3 Type of Malwares Captured – HoneyWindowsBox . . . . . . . . . . .

41

Figure 6.4 Top 15 Countries With Most Attacks – HoneyCamera . . . . . . . . .

43

Figure 6.5 Cumulative Frequency Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

Figure 6.6 The Number of Unique Commands in Each Cluster . . . . . . . . . .

45

Figure 6.7 The Total Number of Executed Commands in Each Cluster . . . . . .

46

Figure 6.8 State Machine that Capture Attack Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

Figure B.1 IRB Approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

v

Abstract
The issue of cybersecurity has become much more prevalent over the last few years, with
a number of widely publicised incidents, hacking attempts and data breaches reaching the
news. There is no sign of an abatement in the number of cyber incidents, and it would be
wise to reconsider the way cybersecurity is viewed and whether a mindset shift is necessary.
Cybersecurity, in general, can be seen as primarily a human problem, and it is for this
reason that it requires human solutions and tradeoffs. In order to study this problem, using
two perspectives; that of the adversaries and that of the defenders, I investigated human
activities in cybersecurity.
The growing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices makes it imperative to be aware
of the real-world threats they face in terms of cybersecurity. While honeypots have been historically used as decoy devices to help researchers/organizations gain a better understanding
of the dynamic of threats on a network and their impact, IoT devices pose a unique challenge for this purpose due to the variety of devices and their physical connections. When
a honeypot is built in such a way that an attacker is given the impression it represents a
real system used by humans and organizations, it will yield useful insights. Identifying these
threats requires an understanding of what attackers are looking for, and how they penetrate
our network. It will therefore be possible to have a more secure and safe environment. In
the first part of this dissertation, I present here a new Internet of Things honeypot framework, called MPMFPot, which can be used to observe real-world attackers’ behavior within
a controlled environment. The MPMFPot framework consists of three layers. As part of
layer 1, I designed a new approach towards creating a multi-phased, multi-faceted honeypot ecosystem, which gradually increases the sophistication of honeypots’ interactions with
adversaries. In addition, I developed and designed a low interaction honeypot for cameras
vi

that allowed researchers to obtain a deeper understanding of what attackers are targeting.
In the second layer, I designed and built a laboratory for Internet of Things(IoT) devices
to analyze the adversaries’ behavior in greater detail. This goal was achieved by developing
and implementing a proxy instance called “ProxyPot” that sits between IoT devices and the
external network and helps researchers study the inbound and outbound communication patterns of these devices. The PorxyPot instance was used to enhance the sophistication of the
honeypots in the previous layer as well as helping the researchers to better understand IoT
attacks in more depth. The third layer, or communication layer, is responsible for connecting
multiple laboratories together. I have also created an innovative data analytics method that
enables us to identify the goals of adversaries. These honeypots have been active for more
than three years now. In each phase, we have been able to collect increasingly sophisticated
attack data. In addition, our data analytics point to the fact that the majority of attacks
caught in the honeypots show striking similarities to a great extent and can be clustered
and grouped to yield a more complete understanding of goals, patterns, and trends of IoT
attacks in the wild. In the second part of this dissertation, I conducted an ethnographic
study of a software development company using the anthropological research method of participant observation for a period of six months. I worked as a software engineer to complete
this effort and took part in all of the development activities as a new employee. During
the course of the fieldwork, I applied and exploited the penetration testing methodology for
the company and studied the developers’ reactions on the spot. During this task I found
1) security vulnerabilities are sometimes intentionally introduced and/or overlooked due to
the difficulty in managing the various stakeholders’ responsibilities in an economic ecosystem, and cannot be simply blamed on developers’ lack of knowledge or skills; 2) accidental
vulnerabilities discovered in the pen-testing process produce different reactions in the development team, often times contrary to what a security researcher would predict. The findings
of this study illustrate the nuanced nature of the root causes of software vulnerability and
the necessity to take into account a significant amount of contextual information in order

vii

to better comprehend how and why software vulnerabilities can develop during software
development. Instead of focusing on the competence of the developers or their practices,
this research sheds light on the often forgotten human factors that significantly influence the
security of software developed by actual companies rather than simply focusing on the deficiencies in developer knowledge or practice. Furthermore, I find that improving the security
of software during the development process can be improved through the implementation of
a co-creation model, where security experts collaborate with software developers to better
identify security concerns and provide tools that are readily applicable within the context of
the software development process.

viii

Chapter 1: Overview

Due to multiple incidents, hacking attempts, and data breaches gaining widespread media
attention and public attention over the last few decades, it has become increasingly important
to implement a robust cybersecurity strategy. In view of the fact that there is no sign of
an abatement in the number of cyber incidents, there is a necessity for us to reconsider
the way cybersecurity is viewed and whether a shift in mindset is necessary. There is no
question that cybersecurity, in general, is primarily a human problem, and, for this reason,
there must be a human solution and tradeoff involved. I conducted research on human
activities in cybersecurity using two perspectives: that of the adversaries and that of the
defenders, in order to study this problem. My objective was to study the attackers’ behavior
by trapping them inside a honeypot and analyzing the commands they executed to learn
about their intentions. Additionally, to take a closer look at the defenders, I became a
software developer and live among them in order to study the security problem from their
native point of view. In my dissertation, I describe these two research projects which I
conducted during the course of my PhD. To begin with, in part one, I will describe the
MPMFPot framework which was designed to study the attacks against IoT devices. The
introduction is in chapter two and the related topics are all discussed. In chapter three, I
explore the MPMFPot framework in more detail. In chapter four, I describe the experiments
that are carried out within the MPMFPot framework. In Chapter five of my dissertation, I
describe the clustering algorithm I developed so that we can analyze how attackers behave
and what their intentions are. Chapter six will describe how I conducted the data analysis
for this part of study. The conclusion of first part will be presented in the seventh chapter.
The second part of this dissertation describes my six-month long embedding study at a small

1

company that provides security software services. The literature review will be presented in
chapter eight. I will explain in chapter nine, how the anthropological method of participant
observation was used to gather data, and how data is then analyzed and synthesized using
general inductive principles. Chapter ten of this study describes the method of pen-testing
I developed and implemented for this study to gain a better understanding of developers’
reactions. The findings from this research are summarized in the eleventh chapter of the
dissertation. At the end, chapter twelfth provides a comprehensive analysis of this study.

2

Chapter 2: MPMFPot – Multi-phased Multi-faceted IoT Honeypot Framework

2.1

Introduction
1

In recent years, IoT devices have become ubiquitous and essential tools people use

every day. The number of Internet-connected devices continues to rise every year, according
to a report by IDC. It was estimated that by 2025, there will be at least 41.6 billion IoT
devices connected to the Internet [42]. Business Insider projected in their report [43] a 512%
increase compared to 2018 (8 billion IoT devices) [43]. The exponential growth raises serious
security concerns. For example, many IoT devices have simple vulnerabilities like default
username and password as well as open telnet/ssh ports. Usually, these devices are placed in
weak or insecure networks, such as those in a home or a public space. In reality, IoT devices
are subject to attacks just as much as traditional computing systems, if not more so. New
IoT devices could open up new entry points for adversaries and expose the entire network.
Around 20% of businesses around the world have experienced at least one IoT-related attack
in the past few years, according to [44, 45].
In the past, cyber-attacks have mostly taken the form of data breaches or compromised
devices used as spamming or DDoS agents. In general, breaches affect important systems
in industry, computer devices, banks, automated vehicles, and smartphones, to name just a
few. Moreover, there are a lot of examples where they have caused serious and significant
damages. Because IoT devices are now an integral part of most people’s lives, cyber-attacks
have become more dangerous because of the widespread use of them. Compared to the the
past, now many more people are at risk and need to be aware of them. As IoT devices
1

Some part of this chapter was published in ACM proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. Permission is included in Appendix A. [1, 2]
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become more common, cyber-attacks are likely to change significantly both in terms of
reasons and methods. Due to the high level of intimacy IoT devices possess to people’s lives,
attacks on them could have much more devastating consequences compared to cyber-attacks
in the past. These threats not only affect more people, but they have also expanded in
scope. Cyber criminals, for example, can cause unprecedented levels of privacy invasion if
they hack into camera devices. These attacks can even endanger people’s lives (imagine an
intruder attempting to take control of an autonomous vehicle).
Another factor exacerbating the situation is a pattern in the IoT industry where speed to
market overrides security concerns. For example, many IoT devices have simple vulnerabilities like default username and password as well as open telnet/ssh ports. Weak or unsecured
networks like those at home or in public places are frequent places that these devices are
installed. The exposure to attacks against IoT devices has unfortunately become a reality,
if not worse than traditional computing systems. The number of IoT attacks increased significantly in 2017 according to a report by Symantec [46]. They identified 50,000 attacks
which had an increase of 600% compared to 2016. In 2021 Kaspersky reported that IoT
attacks more than doubled in the first six months of 2021 compared to the six-month period
before [47]. In addition, attackers have also improved their skills to make these attacks even
more sophisticated with new attacks such as VPNFilter [48], Wicked [49], UPnProxy [50],
Hajime [51], Masuta [52] and Mirai [3] botnet. Adversaries are continuously improving their
skills to make these forms of attacks even more sophisticated. At present, however, few
systematic studies have been conducted on the nature or scope of such attacks in the wild.
As of now, most large-scale attacks on IoT devices in the news have been DDoS attacks (e.g.,
the Mirai attack [3]). Understanding what attackers are doing with IoT devices and what
their motives could be is of utmost importance. There have been various approaches used
by researchers to study the attackers inside the cyber space environment in the past to find
out about new approaches, new tools, etc. Researchers study and identify these problems
using live monitoring systems, data forensics, network telescope and honeypots, among other

4

methods. In this study, one of the main goals was to identify the intentions of humans in
a cybersecurity environment and study them. Consequently, we decided to use a honeypot
for this study, as using a honeypot will give us the opportunity to indirectly interact with
attackers and better understand how they operate in the field by providing them with more
information.

2.2

An Introduction to Honeypots
In cyber security, a honeypot is a device set up for the purpose of attracting attack

activity. Usually, such systems are Internet-facing devices that either emulate or contain
real systems for attackers to target. Since these devices are not intended to serve any other
purpose, any access to them would be considered malicious. Security researchers have used
honeypots for a long time to understand various types of attacker behavior. Honeypots
facilitate researchers’ ability to uncover new methods, tools, and attacks by analyzing data
collected by them (network logs, downloaded files, etc.). This allows for the discovery of zeroday vulnerabilities as well as attack trends. As a result of this information, cyber security
measures can be improved, especially for organizations with limited resources when it comes
to fixing security vulnerabilities.
In the rest of this part, I presents our approach toward a comprehensive experimentation
and engineering framework for capturing and analyzing real-world cyber-attacks on IoT
devices using honeypots. There are a number of challenges when it comes to creating IoT
honeypots and analyzing them for the purpose of producing valuable research data:
1. Various types of IoT devices exist, each of which has unique features that an attacker
may wish to access. In order to capture even a small percentage of all IoT devices, it
is not feasible to build one honeypot system.
2. At this point, there has not been a deep and systematic understanding of the specific
natures of attackers’ activity towards IoT devices, and attackers may have very dif-

5

ferent focuses. Furthermore, IoT devices offer much more varieties of responses than
traditional IT systems due to its interaction with a physical environment. An IoT
camera, for example, will need to display some real video to look like a real device. It
would take an impressive amount of engineering work to replicate these different types
of responses.
3. According to our data, IoT honeypots can collect huge amounts of data, inundating an
analyst’s ability to interpret the data and identify actionable intelligence. A challenge
for researchers involved in IoT honeypot research is to find interesting data from these
huge amounts of data.
We address these challenges through a number of techniques:
1. In order to address the first challenge, we take a multi-faceted approach to the development of IoT honeypots In order to build a variety of honeypot systems for attackers
to target, we adapt off-the-shelf honeypot systems and build some new ones.
2. We adopt a multi-phased approach whereby the sophistication of the emulated responses is increased, as gathered data is analyzed to understand what the attackers
might be trying to accomplish in order to overcome the second challenge.
3. By utilizing the speed and convenience of Cosine Similarity and Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs), we create an clustering algorithm for automatically grouping adversarial
activities in an unsupervised way. This provides an opportunity for revealing more
stealthy activities that would otherwise be buried in the large amount of background
noise.

2.2.1 Honeypots for General Purposes
There are a lot of general-purpose honeypots available, but they’re not specifically targeted towards IoT devices. These honeypots were initially used by researchers to study
6

the IoT attacks since they are capable of simulating some of the well-known services for
IoT devices. There are a number of common honeypots used in general purpose honeynet
architecture, and this section identifies them and describes them.
In 2003, Niels Provos developed the open source computer program “HoneyD” [5], which
enables users to set up and run as many virtual hosts as they wish on a network, all in
one location. Virtual hosts are able to mimic a wide variety of different server types on a
computer network, enabling the user to emulate as many kinds of servers as they desire.
HoneyD is primarily used for computer security software applications. HoneyD was used by
researchers to create low-interaction and scalable honeypots. HoneyD enables the creation of
virtual honeypots as well as the ability to integrate physical honeypots with the application.
It is able to simulate UDP, TCP, FTP, SMTP, Telnet, IS, POP, and Telnet, as well as
simulate various other protocols as well.
Kippo [53] is a Python-based medium-interaction honeypot for SSH. Kippo is capable of
logging brute force attacks and the entire shell interaction performed by an attacker. It has
a fake filesystem, simulating a Debian Linux server, and that is what the attacker sees on
login. The attacker can navigate the system once inside, but he or she cannot effectively do
any harm at all.
Cowrie [54] is a medium interaction honeypot designed to log SSH and Telnet interactions
performed by an attacker, capturing successful brute force attacks and shell interactions.
Cowrie is also capable of serving as a telnet proxy and an SSH proxy for observing the
behavior of an attacker on another system. Cowrie was developed as a fork of Kippo. In the
event that an attacker logs in, they will be able to explore a simulated Linux shell in which
they can run commands and receive realistic looking responses, but these commands will
never have the ability to actually be executed outside of the honeypot environment. The
reason for this is that this Cowrie “shell” is in fact not the same as the Linux shell in any
way. All of the commands and parameters in Cowrie are handled by a Python application.
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Dionaea [55] is a low-interaction honeypot solution released as a successor to “Nepenthes”.
The intention behind the Dionaea project is to trap malware that exploits vulnerabilities
exposed by services that are offered within networks. The Honeypot Dionaea has several
features, including: First, Dionaea is based on a modular architecture that implements
protocol emulation by using Python as a scripting language. As a second benefit, the most
popular protocols implemented in Dionaea are implemented as modules. The protocols that
are emulated by Dionaea are SMB, HTTP, FTP, and TFTP. As a third benefit, this tool
allows you to use several modules which you may not be aware of, which include MSSQL,
MySQL, as well as SIP.
The KFSensor [56] software acts as a honeypot on the Windows operating system. It also
acts as an intrusion detection system. It is its job to attract and to detect all the potential
attackers in the network. Moreover, it achieves that not only by creating a fake environment
which pretends to be a vulnerable one but also by hiding itself as a server, and therefore, not
only does it succeed to catch the attacker, but it also helps to know what their reason may
be. Because it is particularly designed for the Windows operating system, it comes with a
variety of special features that only are available to Windows users. Considering its GUI
based console, its low maintenance, and its ease of use.

2.2.2 Honeypots for Internet of Things
When it comes to IoT honeypots, those that provide complete device emulation capabilities are the most versatile. Throughout this section, you will learn about the honeypots
designed specifically for Internet of Things devices.
Luo et al. [6] developed a honeypot for Internet of Things devices called IoTCandyJar that
enables intelligent interaction. In this intelligent honeypot, which simulates the behavior of
IoT devices without the risk of having its interaction compromised, you will have the benefits
of both high and low interaction honeypots. It actively scans other IoT devices around the
world and sends some part of the received attacks to these devices. It employs ML with
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Markov Decision Process to learn the behavior of IoT devices on the Internet and learn
which has the best response to extend the attack session.
Honware [7] is a highly interactive honeypot framework which supports emulation of
a wide variety of devices without the manufacturers’ hardware being accessed. Honware
automatically processes a standard firmware image, logs an attacker’s activity, and records
which of their actions lead to a compromise. Honware uses Quick Emulator (QEMU), a tool
that enables it to emulate devices to a high degree, and then runs it with a pre-built kernel
and the file system settings on the host OS.
ThingPot [8] is an easy-to-implement medium-interaction, scalable, virtual open-source
honeypot which simulates the entire IoT platform, as well as all application layer protocols
supported by the device. ThingPot simulates the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) and Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) as well as low interaction
for HTTP REST traffic. These services can also be run in a virtual environment by using
docker containers. In addition to supporting XMPP and REST, the controller node stores
data and logs events. With this design, ThingPot was able to mimic a Philips Hue smart
light and allow a real attacker to attempt to break into it.
IoTPOT is a hybrid honeypot proposed by Pa et al. [9], which simulates the Telnet
services for different IoT devices and is primarily concerned with Telnet intrusions. IoTPOT
consists of two parts: a Telnet services “frontend” and a sandboxed “backend”. The frontend low-interaction responder in IoTPOT is used to simulate IoT devices by responding to
TCP requests, banner interactions, authentication requests, and command requests. A highinteraction virtual environment, called IoTBOX, running on Linux is proposed to analyze
attacks, capture malwares, and run malwares across multiple CPU architectures in the backend environment.
A virtual production honeypot, HoneyIo4 [10], simulates four IoT devices (a camera, a
printer, a video game console, and a cash register) with a low level of interaction. Using
HoneyIo4, network scanners that perform reconnaissance attacks are fooled by the simulation
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of IoT OS fingerprints that this honeypot uses. Due to this fake OS information, the attack
is redirected and it becomes unsuccessful.
Conpot [11] has been widely used by researchers as one of the most popular honeypots
for the Industrial Control Systems. Conpot is a low interactive server side ICS honeypot
designed to be easy to deploy, modify and extend. It is a project developed and maintained
by Honeynet Project, and it is used to work on ICS honeypots. The Internet of Things
(IoT) covers a wide range of devices and systems like thermostats, electrical components,
and appliances that bear a very close similarity to ICS. Conpot provides a suite of protocols
that are typically found on ICS networks, throttling their responses to simulate the real
system response time.

2.3

Honeypot Related Research
In essence, a honeypot is designed to fool attackers into thinking that they are accessing

a real system by making them think they have gained access to it in the first place. The
first honeypot was introduced in 2000 [4]. Honeypots can be categorized into two classes:
Low-interaction honeypot and high-interaction honeypot. Low-interaction honeypots only
emulate some services such as SSH or HTTP, whereas high-interaction honeypots provide
a real operating system with lots of vulnerable services [4]. Honeypots are also categorized
based on their purpose [57]. Production honeypots help companies mitigate possible risks,
and research honeypots provide new information for the research community. In terms of
the location of honeypots, there are many options available. The honeypots can be deployed
in cloud computing environments (e.g., Amazon and Azure), Demilitarized Zones (DMZ) of
enterprise networks, or in production environments. It is important to realize that each of
these deployment options has its own advantages and disadvantages. In addition, the type
of deployment environment can influence the choice of honeypot that is most appropriate
for your deployment.
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Alba et al. [12] conducted a survey of existing threats and vulnerabilities on IoT devices.
The first time IoT devices were used as a platform for large Internet-scale attack dates back
to the summer of 2016, when the French hosting company OVH was targeted with the first
wave of Mirai attacks [3]. In the follow-up attack in October 2016, Mirai brought down
the Dyn DNS provider which at the time was hosting major companies’ websites including
Twitter, Github, Paypal and so on. Wang et al. [13] presented an IoT honeypot called IoTCMal, which is a hybrid IoT honeypot framework, includes low-interaction component with
Telnet/SSH service and high-interaction vulnerable IoT devices. Another innovative honeypot is the HoneyPLC honeypot. It develops high-interaction honeypots for Programmable
Logic Controllers (PLCs) within ICS [14]. [15]Using a multi-component honeypot, Semic and
Mrdovic investigated Telnet Mirai attacks. Honeypots are designed to recruit and target attackers by exposing a weak, generic password in the front end of the honeypots. In place of
using an emulation file, the front-end is programmed to generate responses based on input
from the attacker, with logic defined in the code. Anarudh et al. [16] developed a honeypot
model for the main server to shift DoS attacks in IoT networks and to improve the IoT device
performance. Hanson et al. [17] extended the concept of the IoT honeypot by presenting a
hybrid honeynet system that includes virtual and real devices. In order to analyze traffic
and predict the next move of the attackers, the system used machine learning algorithms.
Puna et al. [18] proposed IRASSH-T to develop an IoT honeypot that can automatically
adapt to new threats. To capture more information about target malware, IRISSH-T uses
reinforcement learning algorithms to identify optimal rewards for self-adaptive honeypots
that communicate with attackers. The study by Lingenfelter et al. [19] focused on capturing data on IoT botnets by simulating an IoT system through three Cowrie SSH/Telnet
honeypots. To facilitate as much traffic as possible, their system sets the prefab command
outputs to match those of actual IoT devices, and uses sequence matching connections on
ports. Oza et al. [20] presented a deception and authorization mechanism called OAuth to
mitigate Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks.
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There have also been studies that utilized low-interaction honeypots, high-interaction
honeypots separately or together and studied adversaries’ attacks on IoT devices [21, 22, 23,
24].
Compared to the prior work mentioned above, our main contribution is the design, implementation, and deployment of a multi-phased multi-faceted ecosystem that addresses the
challenges of capturing useful attack data on IoT devices and study adversaries behaviors in
this context. A comprehensive analysis has also been conducted on the captured data logged
by our honeypot framework. With the novel clustering approach that we implemented, we
were able to group attackers together and study their intentions at the same time.

2.4

Chapter Summary
IoT is an area of interest that has rapidly been growing in recent years, and this chapter

discusses why it is important to improve the security of IoT. In order to enhance the security
aspect of IoT devices and have a better understanding of attack vectors against them, we
suggest a framework for an IoT Honeypot based on a multi-phased multi-faceted approach.
To conclude, related research in the field of IoT honeypots is examined in order to gain an
understanding of existing solutions, their shortcomings, and their inspiration in developing
this research.
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Chapter 3: MPMFPot Framework

2

One-shot deployment of IoT honeypots – simply having boxes running emulated or

simulated IoT systems, can only obtain limited attack information. The longer a honeypot
can “hook” an attacker on it, the more useful information can be revealed about attacker goal
and tactics. The more interested an attacker becomes in a device, the more sophisticated
it needs to be to fool them into thinking it is a real device. Due to the rich interaction
an IoT device has with its environment, an IoT honeypot must be organized in a way that
allows intelligent adaptation to varying types of traffic. The effectiveness of this arms race
is measured by how much useful insights can be gleaned for the amount of engineering effort
expended. It is our aim to build a carefully designed a framework that has a variety of
honeypot devices working in concert with a vetting and analysis infrastructure, enabling us
to achieve a high “return on investment.”

3.1

IoT Honeypot Framework Design – The First Step
As we are designing a new IoT honeypot framework, it is important to make sure that

this framework is capable of working with virtually any IoT device. We set out to achieve
this objective by creating an IoT laboratory that would enable us to implement different IoT
devices and, at the same time, understand how they communicate. Having a full laboratory
filled with IoT devices could result in a serious break-in risk that needs to be addressed
in the framework. In order to be able to react to attacks made by an attacker, we have
proposed the addition of another layer on top of the laboratory. IoT devices in the back-end
of the designed framework will be protected by this layer which will reduce the number of
2

Some part of this chapter was published in ACM proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. Permission is included in Appendix A. [1, 2]
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Figure 3.1: MPMFPot Framework Architectural View
communications between a real attacker and the devices. One of the problems with IoT
devices is that there are so many different types of them. As a result, it may be a little
difficult if not impossible to collect the majority of them. In our first study, I proposed
adding a third layer as a communication layer. In this layer, the honeypot framework can
communicate with other IoT laboratories around the world, or it can access the darknet
as a data collection source. Having this layer is essential for the framework because if the
requested device doesn’t exist in the local IoT lab, the framework is able to acquire the
necessary information from other sources and respond to the attack correctly. Figure 3.1
illustrates our first step towards building such a framework. There are three main layers in
this design:
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1. The first layer of this framework acts as a “low-interaction honeypot” that responds to
a simple request from an attacker. Moreover, this layer contains a knowledge database
that can store the requests and responses that take place in this framework. It is the
main purpose of this layer to intercept the attacks without having to interact with the
second layer or the IoT devices themselves.
2. If layer 1 is unable to handle the received request, it will send it to the next layer
for further information to be obtained. The second layer is responsible for processing
requests and responses relating to the IoT devices in our laboratory that are actually
connected to the Internet. This layer is going to contain a proxy that will receive
requests coming through the first layer and then determine which device should be
able to receive the request. Aside from that, it will send back the responses received
from the real devices and pass it back to the first layer, so that it can be stored in the
knowledge-base and also show it to the attacker.
3. In the absence of being able to deal with the received request in the previous layers,
the framework will share the request with the other IoT laboratories and work towards
getting a response from them. The point of this layer is to assist the community in
building a network of IoT laboratories and to share their data so that they may identify
the 0-day attacks on IoT devices.
In the remainder of this chapter, we’ll describe our process for creating layer 1 and layer
2 of this framework. The implementation of layer 3 has been postponed to future.

3.2

Layer 1 – Multi-Phased Multi-Faceted Low-Interaction Ecosystem
In order to implement the layer 1 of the MPMFPot, we implemented and designed a

honeypot ecosystem consisting of three components, outlined in Figure 3.2. In general, the
layer one is what we consider to be the low interaction honeypots. There are three distinct
components in this design:
15

VirusTotal
Vetting System

Honeypot
Container
Honeypot
Container

Storage Correlation Dashboard
Honeypot server farm

Analytics infrastructure

Figure 3.2: Multi-phased Multi-faceted Honeypot Ecosystem
1. honeypot server farms (on premise and in the cloud) that include the honeypot instances
2. a vetting system to ensure that adversaries have a hard time detecting the honeypot
device is a honeypot
3. an analysis infrastructure used to monitor, collect, and analyze the captured data

3.2.1 Honeypot Server Farms
Honeypot Instances are hosted by honeypot server farms. To create a wide geographic
coverage, we use both on-premise servers and cloud instances from AWS [30] and Azure [31] in
multiple countries. Figure 3.3 shows the locations of the honeypot instances deployed in our
server farms. These locations include Australia, Canada, France, India, Singapore, United
Kingdom, Japan, and United States. For the on-premise server farm, we used a PowerEdge
R830 with 256GB of RAM, a VMware ESXi server, and a Synology NAS server for hosting
the honeypots and storing logs. The ESXi server is running five Fedora instances and two
Windows instances. Two Windows servers and four Fedora instances are used to deploy
different honeypots. The fifth Fedora instance runs Splunk [32] to support data monitoring
and analytics. Splunk is a software platform that enables search, analysis, and visualization
of machine-generated data gathered from various sources. Splunk is used for monitoring and
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searching through big data. Information can be indexed and correlated within a container
so it can be searched, but also generates alerts, reports and visualizations based on the
information. For business challenges such as IT management, security and compliance, it
can recognize patterns in data, create metrics, and help diagnose problems. Splunk was
used in this study to collect and analyze log files generated by honeypots in order to find
patterns inside the data. Honeypot instances running on AWS and Azure are either installed
on Ubuntu or Windows depending on what type of honeypot is deployed. At this stage of
our research, we have only used low-interaction honeypots. To run honeypots on Fedora and
Ubuntu instances we utilize Docker containers. Containerization is one of the technologies
that has gained popularity, approval and support in the software development industry over
the past few years. There is a possibility that software can lose functionality when it is moved
between different development environments. This can be prevented by using containers that
ensure no such thing will happen. When considering both the advantages of low interaction
honeypots and the capabilities of containerization architecture, it is obvious that both of
these aspects can be combined to make an effective tool that can detect attacks as soon as
possible. Therefore, it was decided to use this architecture along with honeypots as well.
Every honeypot has a container with all dependencies, configuration files, and libraries it
needs to function without error. A containerization ecosystem known as Docker was used for
this purpose. Splunk receives the logs transmitted over the syslog protocol. In the honeypot
ecosystem, networking controls are implemented through security groups to ensure that
only entities within the honeypot ecosystem can communicate with each other, and external
attackers can only access the honeypot devices through the public-facing interfaces.
In light of the fact that different IoT devices have different specifications and configurations, each honeypot must be designed and configured in a unique way. We adopt a
“multi-faceted” approach to building the various honeypot instances. We both use off-theshelf honeypot emulators and adapt them, and build specific emulators from scratch.
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Figure 3.3: Honeypot Deployment Locations For Server Farms
3.2.1.1

Off-the-shelf Honeypots

Many popular off-the-shelf honeypots emulate general services and protocols that are
not specific to IoT. However since many IoT devices have those services, it is still useful to
adapt these existing honeypots for studying IoT attacks. We evaluated various open-source
and commercial honeypots and selected three off-the-shelf software to use in the first step:
Cowrie [54], Dionaea [55] and KFSensor [56]. In the rest of this section, a brief introduction
of these honeypots is presented.
Cowrie is a low-interaction honeypot3 that attempts to imitate SSH and telnet services to
attract adversaries and capture their interaction. In addition to providing a fake file system
and fake ssh shell, Cowrie can also capture files from the input. It can log every activity in
JSON format for ease of analysis [54]. Considering that many IoT devices still rely on telnet
3

The Cowrie author uses the term “medium interaction” honeypot; but it falls within the low interaction
category based on the definition introduced in Section 2.3.
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and SSH for management, Cowrie is a good honeypot candidate for understanding certain
aspects of attacks against IoT devices. We run Cowrie on Debian inside a docker container.
Dionaea is a low-interaction honeypot that emulates various vulnerable protocols commonly found in a Windows system. It was released in 2013 and is useful for trapping malware
that exploits vulnerabilities [55]. The main function of this honeypot is to capture malicious
files, like worms, that are sent by adversaries. In Dionaea, various protocols can be simulated, including HTTP, MYSQL, SMB, MSSQL, FTP, and MQTT. All detected events are
stored in a SQLite database or in JSON format. We run Dionaea on Debian inside a docker
container.
KFSensor is a commercial Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that acts as a honeypot to
attract and record potential adversaries’ activities. It runs on Windows. KFSensor draws
adversaries’ attention from the real systems to itself, providing valuable information for both
research and operations. KFSensor is also capable of managing the system remotely, easy
integration with other IDSs like Snort [33], and emulating Windows network protocols [56].
Due to Windows’ large footprint as an IoT operating system, both Dionaea and KFSensor
can shed light on attacks on IoT devices. In our server farms, KFSensor is installed in
Windows VMs.

3.2.1.2

HoneyCamera

Cameras have become an interesting target for IoT devices in the past few years. It is
evident that along with the growth in the number of IoT cameras installed, there is also
a rise in the number of attacks against them. As a result, the camera was selected as the
more specific IoT honeypot [25, 26, 27]. Therefore, in order to detect attacks against these
devices, we created a honeypot for IoT cameras and named it HoneyCamera. Figure 3.4
illustrates the honeypot’s architecture. Honeycamera is a low-interaction honeypot for DLink IoT cameras. One of the devices that have gained a lot of attention recently is the
D-Link cameras, which are popular IoT devices. We studied a D-Link camera and carefully
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examined its responses to various types of inputs. Honeycamera uses basic authentication
for login and repeatedly plays a few seconds’ real video as a fake video stream from the
emulated camera device. In addition, we constructed six different pages that emulated the
various features of this IoT camera, such as password changing, reading network information,

Figure 3.4: HoneyCamera Architecture
and adding new users. As we observe the adversaries’ behaviors as they attempt to exploit
these features, we can gain a deeper understanding of what their intentions may be. We also
developed a fake firmware upload service that would let us capture and analyze attack tools
and exploits The adversaries will use this feature in the hope of uploading their malicious
code as firmware into a vulnerable camera device. Then we can study the tools they have
uploaded by storing them and analysing them. Honeycamera records all activities in JSON
format. HoneyCamera is implemented in Python3, runs in Clear Linux [34] that in turn runs
inside a docker container.
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3.2.2 Honeypot Vetting Infrastructure
A honeypot is valuable only as long as it remains undetectable, i.e., unknown to the
attacker as a fake system. This is inherently a hard task since honeypots (especially lowinteraction ones) will inevitably fail to demonstrate some observable features only a real
system can possess, or present ones a real system will never show. An important goal of
the vetting process is to find any leaks of information that could identify the device as a
honeypot, and mitigate such leaks accordingly. The server farms in the cloud are used to
test various fingerprinting techniques to make sure our honeypots cannot be detected easily.
We used manual and automatic fingerprinting methods (e.g., Metasploit [35]). We used
Shodan [36], an IoT search engine that can be used to search for IoT devices on the Internet.
Shodan provides information such as service banners and metadata, and a honeyscore in the
range from 0 to 1 (1 indicates honeypot while 0 means real system). This score provides
a preliminary insight into how good the honeypot impersonates a real device. We also use
Censys [37], another IoT search engine, to help analyze our honeypot instances to make sure
they look like the real ones they imitate. Furthermore, and most importantly, fingerprinting
approaches of attackers can be identified based on the data captured inside honeypots. Using
this insight, we design mitigation solutions that make such fingerprinting ineffective. This is
part of our multiphased honeypot design, which will be explained in more depth in chapter 4.

3.2.3 Data Analytics Infrastructure
In order to be successful, two aspects of a honeypot system are equally important: 1)
how the honeypot software is developed and implemented; and 2) how the captured data
is analyzed. To manage and analyze logs from the honeypot devices, we use Splunk [32].
Splunk provides a tool for creating various queries using its domain-specific language that
can be used to achieve various analysis purposes in this work. Splunk is used to analyze all
the log files collected from our honeypots. To extract valuable information from the collected
logs, we developed a Splunk app. Some example analyses done by the app are identifying
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the combinations of username and password used by attackers, analyzing locations of the
attacks, detecting the most and least frequent commands executed during attack sessions,
analyzing downloaded files and sending them directly to VirusTotal [38], storing the results
and checking attackers’ IPs through DShield [39] and AbuseIPDB [40], and so on. These are
only some of the most important features that were put in this log management component.
In addition, Splunk can collect and visualize data in real time, streamline investigations,
search logs dynamically, and take advantage of AI and machine learning embedded in it.

3.3

Layer 2 – Internet of Things Laboratory and ProxyPot
Towards implementation layer 2, the IoT laboratory is first implemented as part of the

MPMFPot framework. Furthermore, we designed and implemented the ProxyPot as well.
The remainder of this section will describe each of these approaches in detail.

3.3.1 Internet of Things Laboratory
The Internet-of-Things-Laboratory (IoT-Lab) at the University of South Florida has
been designed as an innovative laboratory environment. In this lab, the main purpose is
to examine the communication of the different IoT devices from the security point of view,
as well as to assist the MPMFPot framework in terms of being able to produce meaningful
responses for the first layer. A number of devices have been purchased for this laboratory.
In order to connect to the internet, IoT devices either use a WIFI connection or network
access through a local area network. Figure 3.5a and 3.5b represents a view of the IoT-Lab
diagram and environment.
A total of 13 devices have been selected for the first stage of implementation. Listed in
table 3.1 are these devices and their connection to the network.
4
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Internet of Things Laboratory (IoT-Lab)
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(a) A Diagram of IoT Laboratory4

(b) An Overview of the IoT-Lab

Figure 3.5: IoT Laboratory Diagrams
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Table 3.1: List IoT Devices Installed in the Layer 2 of MPMFPot Framework
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Device Name
Nest Camera Indoor
Nest Camera Outdoor
TP Link Smart Outlet 1
TP Link Smart Outlet 2
Nest Smoke Detector
Amazon Echo
Samsung SmartThings
Wink Hub
LaMetric LM7879
D-link Camera
August Doorbell
August Connect
Philips Hue

MAC Address
18:B4:30:5E:C1:59
18:B4:30:E4:60:B7
50:C7:BF:78:D1:1D
50:C7:BF:78:E3:02
18:B4:30:9D:25:F5
4C:EF:C0:5D:76:9D
D0:52:A8:A0:6C:B4
00:21:CC:4D:53:EA
88:83:5D:FB:83:9D
B0:C5:54:3F:DD:B1
AC:83:F3:A4:43:2E
D8:61:62:12:62:C6
00:17:88:27:D8:D1

Internet Connection
WIFI
WIFI
WIFI
WIFI
WIFI
WIFI
LAN
LAN
WIFI
LAN
WIFI
WIFI
LAN

3.3.2 ProxyPot
IoT Lab was designed and developed with the primary goal of studying the communication of each device that is integrated into it. These communication knowledge will aid us to
better understand how the legitimate activities look like when the objective is to access an
Internet of Things device. Also, the second layer of MPMHPot plays a very important role
in the whole framework when it comes to interaction with the IoT devices in our laboratory and providing meaningful responses to the first layer. This way, the framework is able
to speak with many more cyber-threat actors. First, I designed and implemented a proxy
instance on top of the lab, called it ProxyPot, and enables it to communicate with various
lab devices. In short, ProxyPot is a proxy instance that sits between an IoT device and a
network gateway, capturing all traffic between these devices. A diagram of the ProxyPot architecture is shown in Figure 3.6. The proxypot application has been written in Python and
installed within a Raspberry Pi3 model B in our IoT-Lab. I have designed several modules
specifically for this device. The first is a scanning module which does a scan of the network
using the Nmap back-end which enables the software to identify the devices that are connected to the network automatically. The second component is a Man-in-the-Middle module
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Figure 3.6: An Overview of ProxyPot Architecture
uniquely designed for the ProxyPot. This module allows the ProxyPot to put itself in the
way between the gateway and the target device and to monitor all the traffic that passes
between them. In addition, the device also has a capability of capturing traffic. Through
the use of T-Shark, ProxyPot is able to capture the traffic in the pcap format and convert
it into the JSON format for further analysis. After that, ProxyPot uses the report module
to send the JSON files to the analysis infrastructure and store them there. During nearly
a year, I had the ProxyPot running in our lab. The first result of this data analysis was
used to add more information into the HoneyCamera’s second phase installation(section 4.3
provides more information).

3.4

Chapter Summary
It was discussed in this section how we designed and implemented a honeypot framework

that is effective for IoT devices. Because IoT devices create a variety of challenges on this
topic, I propose the “MPMFPot – Multi-phased Multi-faceted – IoT honeypot framework”
that addresses these challenges. A detailed explanation of the different components of this
architecture is provided in this section. As well as utilizing well-known off-the-shelf honeypots, I have designed the HoneyCamera and ProxyPot to meet the requirements of this
framework. Detailed information about these two instances is provided in this section.
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Chapter 4: Multi-faceted and Multi-phased Deployment/Experimentation

5

In the first layer, we use a multi-phased approach to introduce sophistication into how

our honeypots respond to attacker traffic, based on traffic collected previously. In the first
phase, we simply deploy the honeypot at hand and receive attack traffic. From this point
forward, the honeypot ecosystem collects data, and that data will be analyzed in order to
create the subsequent phases defined by what attackers seem to be looking for, and we can
emulate those responses accordingly. We go through multiple iterations until we are satisfied
with the insights we gained and the attacker’s behaviors. The insights from the previous
phase are used to drive the creation of more sophisticated low-interaction honeypots. We
present this multi-phased process from three facets that our honeypots attempt to capture
about IoT attacks: attacks through login service to obtain a command shell, windows service
attacks resulting in malware download, and IoT camera attacks.

4.1

HoneyShell
We use the “Cowrie” honeypots for emulating vulnerable IoT devices over SSH (port 22)

and telnet (port 23). Cowrie can be configured to emulate different types of operating systems. A popular Linux distribution for IoT devices is busybox [41]. Therefore, we configure
our Cowrie honeypots to emulate busybox. Three Cowrie honeypots were created for the
three phases.
• During Phase 1, an initial version of cowrie is deployed with minimal changes to the
original code. This step was designed to begin collecting data that would be used in
5

Some part of this chapter was published in ACM proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. Permission is included in Appendix A. [1, 2]
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the next step and identify any information leakage. Every possible combination of
usernames and passwords are accepted by the honeypot at this stage. We deployed
four honeypot instances – two on-premise and two in the cloud (Singapore, United
states).
• In Phase 2, honeypot instances were deployed on-premises after six months of testing
the phase 1 infrastructure. Our honeypot instances are filled with more data as we
fix bugs. We selected the top 30 username/password combinations that executed at
least one command after logging in as the authentication credentials for our honeypot.
We gathered this information from our analysis component. The honeypot will display
login failure messages for any other combination of username and password. A further
modification of the emulation mechanism is that it is configured in such a way that
attackers are provided with more meaningful responses, such as adding new usernames
and file systems to the configuration. In addition, we emulated new commands and
added them to the honeypot configuration files in order to attract more activity. We
also analyzed phase 1 logs for fingerprinting techniques used by attackers, in order to
handle them properly in phase 2. Examples include file command’s response being
added to the honeypot configuration.
• In Phase 3, the key part is using all of the information that has been collected so far to
create a more sophisticated honeypot. The purpose of this step was to design a honeypot instance that could attract a real human (attacker) into it. Therefore, a complex
password was generated, and only one possible login combination was possible. Due
to the complexity of the password, a successful login indicated it was probably a real
hacker, and therefore extremely valuable information could be gathered. The honeypot
filesystem was replaced by a cloned version of the operational system’s filesystem. All
confidential information is replaced with fake information, so in case a hacker successfully logged into the honeypot, it is not exposing any real data.
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4.2

HoneyWindowsBox
Using “Dionaea”, we emulate IoT devices running on Windows. The majority of these

attacks result in malware being downloaded on the device. It would require some additional
work to further emulate the downloaded malware’s behavior inside a honeypot, so this is
reserved for future work. In this work, we use phase 2 of this honeypot to apply our vetting
system to ensure they are not easily identifiable as honeypots.
• In Phase 1, a default version of Dionaea was deployed in the cloud. To identify the
weak point of Dionaea, we used the cloud infrastructure as a test bed. AWS France
hosts an instance of this honeypot. This instance was detected quickly as a honeypot
by our vetting system. Nevertheless, it continued to capture automated malicious
activities, which helped us create phase 2.
• During Phase 2, various services were broken down into two different combinations.
The first honeypot provides FTP, HTTP, and HTTPS, whereas the second only provides SMB and MSSQL. These two versions were deployed across three locations (India,
Canada, and on-premise). In our vetting system, these IP addresses appeared as real
systems. We enhanced the HoneyWindowsBox by introducing the KFSensor into the
ecosystem to add more coverage into our honeypot. As for the locations, we chose
Paris and on-premise, and each instance was vetted.

4.3

HoneyCamera
The “HoneyCamera” was the last one to be implemented. During this step, we will

simulate the behavior of an IoT device more specifically. We chose the D-Link camera
from our IoT-Lab for this study. ProxyPot was used to study the camera’s communication
with the outside world. HoneyCamera was designed based on the data collected from the
ProxyPot. By implementing the first version, we began collecting logs against it. Using
the collected data, we identified possible weaknesses within the application. In the second
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phase, we improved the application and also added some new vulnerabilities we observed
adversaries trying to exploit in the previous phase. To increase the sophistication of this
honeypot, a HoneyShell instance was also added to the HoneyCamera.
• Phase 1, involved the deployment of three honeypots. The two instances in Sydney
and Paris only had port 8080 open, while the one in London had port 80. The first two
honeypots were used to emulate D-Link DCS-5020L and the other one to imitate DLink DCS-5030L camera. Instances of this type are configured in such a way that they
provide as much information as an interaction-based honeypot can. These instances of
HoneyCameras were identified as real IoT devices by our vetting system. Data collected
in this phase indicated that attackers were also trying to exploit known vulnerabilities
related to the IoT cameras.
• Phase 2, We discovered 6 vulnerabilities that attackers attempted to exploit inside
HoneyCamera from the data collected in Phase 1. The most common bug was Authentication Information leakage. These vulnerabilities were carefully studied, and
we incorporated the corresponding responses into HoneyCamera instances. Additionally, the IoT cameras are equipped with a telnet/SSH port for remote configuration
and diagnostic purposes. In order to replicate these types of activities, we combined
our HoneyShell and HoneyCamera and deployed them as single instances into the onpremise and cloud (Tokyo) infrastructures. Using HoneyCamera and HoneyShell, we
were able to identify attacker behavior that involves both Unix command-line and
camera-specific commands.

4.4

Chapter Summary
The aim of this chapter is to describe the implementation and experimentation of the

multi-faceted and multi-phased IoT honeypot ecosystem. There are three components implemented by this framework: Honeyshell, HoneyWindowsBox, and HoneyCamera. All of
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them are deployed according to multiple phases. In the first phase, all we need to do is
deploy the honeypot and wait for the attack traffic to come in. The second phase goes
through many iterations until we are satisfied with the insights we gained and the attackers’
behaviors elicited. Later on, in the third phase, these insights are used to create even more
advanced low-interaction honeypots.
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Chapter 5: Analysis of Honeypot Logs – A Clustering Approach

For the unique nature of IoT devices’ communication and the various types of commands,
it can be difficult to discover new or unknown cyber attacks against these devices. To
differentiate between different malicious actors such as Bot actors and Zero-day attacks, we
need to better understand how commands cause program execution. One key observation
from our data is that the honeypot instances collect huge amount of attack activities, but
most of these activities belong to a few categories. Activities in the same category show
similarity among one another. This inspires us to design an unsupervised approach using
clustering, so that we can group similar attacks together to make the attackers’ intentions
clear.
We adopt a distance-based clustering method, which utilizes “cosine similarity” and the
unsupervised learning algorithm “Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM)” [29] to calculate the
distances between different commands executed in the honeypot and perform clustering
based on this metric. We then identify “actors” (represented as unique IP addresses) that
share similar commands according to the clustering results, and group the actors based on
this similarity. The attacker intentions then emerge from those groupings. In the rest of this
chapter we describe the clustering and grouping algorithms and the intuitions behind them.

5.1

Clustering of Captured Commands

5.1.1 Similarity Metrics
Our honeypots captured large numbers of commands through SSH login sessions. We
used cosine similarity as the metric for determining how similar two commands are [28]. It
measures the cosine of the angle between two vectors in a multidimensional space. In this
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context, the two vectors are arrays containing the word counts of two commands executed
inside a honeypot. A smaller angle means a higher similarity. Using the Euclidean dot
product formula, the cosine of two non-zero vectors A and B can be found through the
following equation.
A · B = ∥A∥∥B∥ cos θ

(5.1)

where θ is the measure of the angle between A and B in a high-dimensional space. The
similarity is then calculated as:
Pn
Ai Bi
A·B
= pPn i=12 pPn
similarity(A, B) =
2
∥A∥∥B∥
i=1 Ai
i=1 Bi

(5.2)

where Ai and Bi are components of vector A and B respectively. The values are between
0 and 1. A cosine value of 0 means that the two vectors are at 90 degrees to each other
(orthogonal) and have no match. The closer the cosine value to 1, the smaller the angle
and the greater the match between the two vectors. As an example, the cosine similarity
between the following two commands is 0.6249.
“cat /proc/cpuinfo — grep name — cut -f2 -d: — uniq -c”
“cat /proc/cpuinfo — grep name — head -n 1 — awk {print $4,$5,$6,$7,$8,$9;}”
5.1.2 Clustering Approach
Researchers have been struggling for the past decades to devise mechanisms to detect
cyber-security threats. This period of effort resulted in a number of novel approach such as
rule-based, signature-based, and supervised Machine Learning (ML) algorithms that were
developed to detect intrusions that have already been encountered and classified as such.
The reality is that new unknown threats go undetected as they are often misclassified by
those techniques and are often referred to as zero-day attacks or zero-day threats. Therefore, we used a soft clustering method known as Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM), which are
probabilistic models for representing normally distributed subpopulations within an overall
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population. It is a form of unsupervised learning. First, we extract all executed commands
from the HoneyShell logs. We calculate cosine similarity metrics between the unique commands, and then used the Gaussian Mixture Model to create the clusters where similar
commands are clustered together.
We examined the created clusters carefully and identified the objective(s) behind each
cluster at a higher level. Some commands had multiple subcommands — the adversaries
executed them all together in a single composite command. Such composite commands may
be clustered with other commands that share some characteristics, but not all of them. For
this reason, a cluster may be labeled with multiple objectives, but not every command in the
cluster demonstrates all the objectives. Here are a few examples of how clusters’ objectives
(or goals) look like
• Cluster 7 includes commands such as free -m and free -h. These commands display
information about how much physical memory and swap memory is present, as well
as how much free and used memory is available. We identify the objective as “System
Intelligence.”
• Cluster 17 includes lspci grep VGA. The adversaries are trying to obtain information
pertaining to the GPU. We identify the objective as “GPU intelligence.”
• Cluster 24 consists of cat /proc/cpuinfo. This command attempts to extract information about the CPU cluster; we thus named the objective “CPU Intelligence.”
• One command included in Cluster 21 is git clone https://github.com/robertdavidgraham
/masscan.git. Masscan is an Internet-scale port scanner. According to the author, it is
capable of scanning the entire Internet within 5 minutes, sending 10 million packets per
second, from a single machine. The cluster also includes wget -c http://222.186.139.216:
9960/chongfu.sh, which the VirusTotal report indicates that the file contains a Shell
Downloader. These data led us to identify the objectives as “Pivot point,” “Malicious
Installation,” and “Resource Capture /Extraction.”
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• Cluster 37 includes the command /etc/init.d/iptables stop, which indicates that an
attacker tried to disable the firewall. As a result, we identified the objective as “Stop
Services.”
We went through all the unique commands in each cluster to identify the objectives
behind those commands. Appendix C provides an exhibit of all the clusters from our analysis,
along with all the objectives identified in each cluster.

5.2

Identifying Common Patterns Behind Attacker Intentions
Our next step is to use the clustering results to help us identify the intentions behind

the malicious actors. For simplicity, we identify a maclicious actor as a remote source IP
address identified in the honeypot log. We wanted to find out whether different actors
exhibit similar behaviors through shared command clusters. The intuition is that if two
actors’ commands fall into a number of the same command clusters, the shared clusters then
represent a pattern of behaviors that likely pursue the same type of objectives. By identifying
such shared command clusters, we can identify common patterns behind attacker intentions.
We first find all the pair-wise overlaps of command cluster IDs between any two actors
(IP addresses). Two actors do not have to share the exact same commands to have overlap,
as long as the commands belong to the same cluster as identified in the process described in
Section 5.1.2. For an overlap to count as a pattern, it needs to be shared by at least three
actors, and has a minimum of ten different clusters. For each pattern, we also associate it
with the actors that manifest it, i.e., the IP addresses demonstrate the commands belonging
to all the clusters in the pattern. We use the term “group” to refer to these actors (IP
addresses) that share that pattern. Some actors may be associated with multiple groups,
i.e., they demonstrate multiple patterns in their recorded behaviors. If an attacker shares
the same pattern, their corresponding actions have the same intentions, even thought the
specific techniques and tools may be different. Using this approach, we could determine
attack trends and intentions. As soon as a new vulnerability is known in the wild, adversaries
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will try to take advantage of it as soon as possible and target as many victims as they can.
Thus these new activities will likely form a pattern observable from the honeypots. Finding
these patterns and the associated malicious actors could allow defenders to determine if the
attackers might launch the next steps of their attacks, and take actions accordingly.

5.3

Chapter Summary
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce a new approach for identifying the distribution

of similar attack commands inside a honeypot by using clustering methods. Cosine similarity
and Gaussian mixtures were used to group executed commands into 50 clusters. Using these
information, we identified the purposes of each cluster and labelled them accordingly. It
should be noted that there are some clusters that have more than one label. This may be
due to the fact that similar commands may run for different reasons. Also, we used these
clusters to group attack actors (based on the source IP address). Every group represented a
higher level purpose from the outset until the end.
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Chapter 6: Experimentation and Data Analysis

6

A total number of 22,629,347 hits were captured by our honeypot ecosystem over a

period of three year. As shown in Table 6.1, HoneyShell attracted the most hits. This
information is described in detail in the rest of this section.
Table 6.1: Number of Hits Based on Different Honeypot Facets
Honeypot

Up Time

# of Hits

HoneyShell

12 months

17,343,412

HoneyWindowsBox

7 months

1,618,906

HoneyCamera

25 months

3,667,029

In the following sections, I present the results from the experimentation of the multiphased honeypot evolution as described in Section 4. The analysis presented therein is
based on data collected in the last phase in each experiment7 .

6.1

HoneyShell
Cowrie honeypots were able to capture the largest portion of the hits during this period.

Figure 6.1 represents the number of hits based on locations and phases. It is notable that the
on-premise phase 2 honeypot captured more hits in 6 months’ time than the on-premise phase
1 honeypot did in a year, clearly showing the effectiveness of the multi-phased approach.
Figure 6.2 shows that the majority of connections came from China, Ireland and the United
Kingdom.
6

Some part of this chapter was published in ACM proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security. Permission is included in Appendix A. [1, 2]
7
In the discussion I sometimes mention data from earlier phases for the purpose of comparison.

36

·106
6.5

6

5.5

Number of hits

5

4.5

4

3.5

3

2.5
Singapore Phase 1

On-premise Phase 1

On-premise Phase 2

On-premise Phase 3

Figure 6.1: Hits per Location/Phase – HoneyShell

Figure 6.2: Top 10 Countries with the Most Connections – HoneyShell
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Furthermore, statistics shows that 15% of the total number of hits belong to successful
logins. Most of these logins used random combinations of username and password which
shows that automated scripts were used to find the correct authentications blindly. Table
6.2 represents the top 10 username/password combinations that were used by attackers.
The information seems to indicate that attackers commonly look for high-value user with
a weak password. However, by looking into the database, some other combinations such
as “university/florida”, “root/university” and “university/student” were found inside the
on-premise honeypot (inside a university) which indicates that attackers were aware of the
organization’s nature. and tried to customize their attacks based on that.
Table 6.2: Top 10 Username and Password Combinations – HoneyShell
Username/Password

Occurrences

admin / 1234

975729

root / (empty)

167869

admin / (empty)

82018

0 / (empty)

62140

(empty) / root

52780

1234 / 1234

50305

admin / admin

39349

admin / 1234567890

12444

root / admin

10359

In addition, only 314,112 (13%) unique sessions were detected with at least one successful
command execution inside the honeypots. This result indicates that only a small portion
of the attacks executed their next step, and the rest (87%) solely tried to find the correct
username/password combination. A total number of 236 unique files were downloaded into
honeypots. 46% of the downloaded files belong to three honeypots inside the university, and
the other 54% were found in the honeypot in Singapore. Table 6.3 demonstrates categorization of the captured malicious files by Cowrie. VirusTotal flagged all these files as malicious.
DoS/DDoS executables were the most downloaded ones inside honeypots. Attackers tried
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to use these honeypots as a part of their botnets. IRCBot/Mirai and Shelldownloader were
the second most downloaded files. It shows that Mirai, which was first introduced in 2016,
is still an active botnet and has been trying to add more devices to itself ever since. Shelldownloader tried to download various formats of files that can be run in different operating
systems’ architectures like x86, arm, i686 and mips. It should be highlighted that since adversaries were trying to gain access in their first attempt, they would run all the executable
files. SSH scanner, mass scan and DNS Poisoning are categorized in the “Others” section of
Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Categorization of Downloaded Files – HoneyShell
Malicious Files Campaign

Amount

Dos/DDos

59

IRCBot/Mirai

40

SHELLDownloader

40

BACKDOOR

36

CoinMiner

31

Others

30

Besides downloading files, attackers tried to run different commands. Table 6.4 shows
the top 10 commands executed with their occurrence number.

6.2

HoneyWindowsBox
Dionaea was representing a vulnerable Windows operating system. Most of the con-

nections came from the United States followed by China and Brazil. During the usage of
Dionaea, 43 unique files were captured in our on-premise infrastructure. Type of malwares
observed by our HoneyWindowsBox is represented in figure 6.3. HTTP was the protocol
used the most by attackers. FTP and smb were also used to download malicious files. In addition, a noticeable amount of SIP communication was found in the process of examination.
SIP is mostly used by VoIP technology, and like other services, it suffers from common vul39

Table 6.4: Top 10 Commands Executed – HoneyShell
Command

Occurences

cat /proc/cpuinfo

15453

free -m

11344

ps -x

11204

uname -a

5965

export HISTFILE= /dev/null

5949

grep name

3798

/bin/busybox cp; /gisdfoewrsfdf

1141

/ip cloud print

883

lspci — grep VGA — head -n 2 — tail -1 —
´
awk {print
$5}´

532

nerabilities such as buffer overflow and code injection. Collected data from these honeypots
was used to create a more realistic file system for other honeypots.
KFSensor is an IDS-based honeypot. It listens to all ports and tries to create a proper
response for each request it receives. The information gathered from this honeypot was also
used to create a better environment and file system for Dionaea.

6.3

HoneyCamera
Six IoT camera devices were emulated using HoneyCamera. Figure 6.4 shows that most

attacks captured inside the on-premise HoneyCamera came from Chile. Several malicious
files attempt to be installed in these honeypots. These were mainly coin-miner and Mirai
(variants) files. Analyzing the captured logs reveals that this honeypot attracted many
attacks specifically targeting IoT cameras. Here are some examples:
• The first attack found was camera credential brute-force (/?action=stream/snapshot.cgi?user=[USERNAME]&pwd=[PASSWORD]&count=0 ). On this attack, adversaries
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Figure 6.3: Type of Malwares Captured – HoneyWindowsBox
tried to find a correct combination of username and password to get access to the
video streaming service.
• The second attack found was trying to exploit CVE-2018-9995 vulnerability. This
vulnerability allows attackers to bypass credential via a “Cookie: uid=admin” header
and get access to the camera (/device.rsp?opt=user&cmd=list).
• A list of more attacks can be found in Table 6.5. D-Link, Foscam, Hikvision, Netwave
and AIVI were only some of the targeted cameras found from the data collected from
these honeypots.
In addition, attackers mostly (92%) used GET protocol to communicate with the honeypots, 5% used POST method. The rest 3% used other methods such as CONNECT, HEAD,
PUT, etc. Table 6.6 and table 6.7 represent the top 10 username and password that were
used by attackers to login into the on-premise HoneyCamera.
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Table 6.5: Attack Types Executed – HoneyCamera
Attack Type
[CVE-2013-1599] DLINK Camera
Hikvision IP Camera - Bypass Authentication
Netwave IP Camera - Password Disclosure
AIVI Tech Camera - command injection
IP Camera - Shellshock
Foscam IP Camera - Bypass Authentication
Malicious Activity
Table 6.6: Top 10 Username Used – HoneyCamera
Username

Occurrences

admin

1891

666666

1229

888888

1224

1111111

1215

12345

1211

1234

1211

123456

1210

123

1210

Aadmin

971

We intentionally crafted the HoneyCamera vulnerability to reveal the username and password for the login pages. We instrumented the vulnerable page such that a successful exploit
will reveal the username and password as an image inside the HTML page, indistinguishable
to humans’ eyes from the effect of the real vulnerability. Based on the analysis of the log files,
29 IP addresses exploited this vulnerability and successfully logged into the Honeycamera
web console and explored it. The pattern of the user’s movements between different web
pages and the fact that the username and password were only visible to humans’ eyes indi-
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Figure 6.4: Top 15 Countries With Most Attacks – HoneyCamera
Table 6.7: Top 10 Password Used – HoneyCamera
Password

Occurrences

admin

1280

8hYTSUFk

150

password

116

123456

70

admin1

65

1234

65

admin123

64

12345

63

password1

60

cate that these activities likely were performed by a real person as opposed to an automated
program.
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6.4

Experimentation on the Clustering Algorithm
In order to identify the attacker’s intentions, we began by extracting all of the commands

executed from HoneyShell’s logs. This experiment was conducted using Singapore Honeyshell
logs. The total number of unique commands found in this process was 526. After applying
the algorithm outlined in chapter 5, 50 clusters have been generated. Figure 6.6 shows
the distribution of the number of unique commands that occur in each cluster. Figure 6.7

Figure 6.5: Cumulative Frequency Distribution
shows the total number of commands executed in each cluster. As can be seen on figure 1 ,
the majority of commands executed (99.7%) belong to only six clusters [18,25,26,27,39,40].
There are two major attacks that are grouped together in these clusters: Fingerprinting and
Mirai and its variants. Figure 6.5 represent the Cumulative Frequency Distribution for the
number of commands executed in each cluster.
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Figure 6.6: The Number of Unique Commands in Each Cluster
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Figure 6.7: The Total Number of Executed Commands in Each Cluster
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6.5

Experimentation on the Grouping Algorithm
In Section 5.2, we described our approach to identify attacker patterns and group the

adversaries together based on those patterns. As a result of this process, 84 different patterns/groups were identified. Examining the command clusters and the concrete commands
in each group, reveals how the adversaries’ attack patterns are arranged.
As a high-level strategy, we classified the attack commands into three categories: 1)
Fingerprinting, 2) Malicious Activities, and 3) Miscellaneous. Activities related to fingerprinting aim to identify the resources on a target, such as the number of CPUs, whether
the target has GPUs, HoneyPot fingerprinting activities, etc. As a result of these details,
adversaries select their candidate for the next step of their attacks. The next steps may
result in the installation of malicious software if the target returns a satisfactory result. Our
analysis shows the presence of a large amount of malware and coin-miners installed at that
time. Sufficiently advanced bots, such as Mirai and its variants, begin their activities after a
successful login into the target. Malicious Activity is the second high-level category, which
includes the commands that attempt installing malicious programs in the honeypot without
fingerprinting. Other commands executed inside our HoneyShell are defined as Miscellaneous. This includes stopping services, creating pivot points, scanning the network, and so
on.
We created a state machine (Fig 6.8) that defines the possible transitions from one goal
to another, based on manual inspections of the patterns identified above. The state machine
could be used to forecast the goals of an attacker in the future. We provide an example
below to illustrate how we utilize the patterns to create the state machine. We grouped 90
IP addresses in group 5. Among the clusters shared by these 90 IP addresses, there were 25,
17, 23, 39, 35, 46, 5, 9, 30 and 24. The concrete commands from these clusters include the
following (not based on time order).
• uname -a
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Figure 6.8: State Machine that Capture Attack Patterns
• curl -fsSL http://tp2.bizqsoft.com/cache/uname -s.uname -m -o /tmp/.syslog;chmod
0777 /tmp/.syslog;/tmp/.syslog;rm -rf /tmp/.syslog
• chmod 755 /usr/bin/wget
• wget -P/tmp http://118.184.50.24:7777/ppol
• echo ’ ’ > /var/log/messages
In light of these data and after analyzing the clusters and commands, we abstract this
pattern as the following: Fingerprinting → System Intelligence → Malicious Installation.
In particular, uname -a and echo ’ ’ > /var/log/messages belong to System Intelligence,
which is part of Fingerprinting. The other commands fall into the category of Malicious
Installation.
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6.6

Chapter Summary
This chapter illustrates the different data analytics for each facet based on our “Data

Analytics Infrastructure”. Some of these details include the number of hits, the top command
executed, the locations of the top attackers, etc. This chapter also includes experiments on
grouping and clustering.
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion

Analyzing the data from our IoT honeypot ecosystem in several phases yielded some
interesting results. As it turns out, IoT devices are under heavy attack by automated tools
and bots. The Mirai and its variants are still active, looking for targets to add to their
arsenal. Additionally, the increasing sophistication in the data we collected in each phase
proves that the multi-faceted multi-phased approach is a useful approach for designing an
IoT honeypot ecosystem to study and identify unknown novel attacks. This was further
supported by human activities we captured in HoneyCamera as presented in section 6.3.
The vast majority of data captured in our ecosystem was bot-related. This makes it difficult
to detect unknown and stealthy attacks. Our clustering algorithm provides the insight that
by utilizing a syntax-based similarity metrics we can group the most executed commands
together, providing important insights for understanding the background noise. In addition,
our grouping algorithm attempts to identify the various intentions of the attackers based on
their commands as they show up in the various clusters. A future direction is to further
research the granularity of such intentions to visualize more fine-grained steps of attackers’
mode of operations.
The MPMFPot is a multi-layered, multi-phased and multi-faceted approach to building
a honeypot ecosystem for the Internet of Things presented in this part. As part of the
implementation process, two new instances were designed and implemented, HoneyCamera,
a new honeypot that is low-interaction and focused on camera devices, and Proxypot, a
proxy instance that captures the traffic between IoT devices and the gateway. Analysis
on the information captured during this work shows that adversaries generally look for
vulnerable IoT devices to exploit them. Moreover, the results indicate that a more realistic
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and well-configured low-interaction honeypot will attract more attacks in the same network
compared to a honeypot that is poorly configured. According to HoneyCamera’s log files,
IoT camera devices have become an interesting target for attackers in recent years. A number
of different vulnerabilities were found from this process.
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Chapter 8: A Co-Creation Models to Improve the Software Development
Process

8.1

Introduction
8

A major part of ever-present software vulnerabilities can be attributed to human factors,

with substantial research devoted to this area [59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68]. These
Researchers have utilized various approaches in past efforts, such as surveys, interviews,
experiments, examining code artifacts and studying competition results. It is also understood
that software insecurity has a fundamental economic basis [69], and industry often seems
reluctant to give code security the same priority as other business considerations, such as the
speed of time to market and richness of features. Therefore, it is crucial to recognize that
software security (in)security is not solely driven by the developers’ knowledge and skills and
the coding languages and environments that they use, but also by the various incentives in
the market and within the organization. It is therefore essential to study secure software
development within the context of where it happens, i.e., within software companies, to have
a real impact. Incentive structures, organizational relationships, work flow, and other factors
impact human behaviors in specific contexts; this specificity is hard to replicate in controlled
settings and to assess using standardized surveys or interviews [70, 71]. Replication research
also requires understanding these structures and relationships in the first place, which close
proximity observation facilitates [72, 73, 74, 75].
In a recent study, Sundaramurthy et al. [76, 77] demonstrated that participant observation, an anthropological research method [78, 79], allows researchers to gain a better under8

Some part of this chapter was published in proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security. Permission is included in Appendix A. [58]
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standing of the challenges faced by security analysts in security operations centers (SOCs).
The embedding in SOCs also allowed the researchers to develop non-technical and technical
interventions to improve their work processes and environments by addressing specific pain
points within them. Following the success of that study, we conducted an ethnographic
study at a software company utilizing the same method of participant observation. An anthropologist trained two PhD students in computer science in qualitative research methods,
and they spent 1.5 years taking part in the fieldwork. Researchers performed normal business activities throughout the study period, including coding and participating in meetings,
while observing and studying software (in)security issues through analysis of historical details (code repositories and ticketing system records), pen-testing the developed software
and observing how developers and managers address vulnerabilities. After collecting their
observations, the fieldworkers shared their insights with a larger group of researchers, including an anthropologist and two computer science professors who collaborated on this
study. Research team weekly meetings allowed the discussion of emerging data, as well as
the identifying of specific research topics and areas for further data collection and analysis.
The information provided in this part is only based on the author’s analysis of his field
notes. This part also describes the emerging themes and patterns in the research. I discuss
several explanations for the developers’ inconsistent narratives, as well as their reactions to
the security concerns, based on these theme. In addition, the dissertation’s author is referred
to as a “researcher” throughout this part.

8.2

Literature Review
Assal and Chiasson [59, 60] utilized interviews and surveys to explore the interplay be-

tween developers and software security processes. Their research found that developers were
motivated to develop secure code, but were often hindered by a mismanaged organizational
process. The authors advocated looking beyond developers and examining broader organizational factors that may impact the security of the developed software. Our work is one
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such attempt, utilizing an extensive ethnographic study in a software company. Many of
our findings confirmed the analysis results from Assal and Chiasson’s work. Our work also
revealed some deeper insights into the reason of software (in)security, as well as a co-creation
model that can help address them.
Ruef et al. [61] and Votipka, et al. [62] conducted a series of studies based on data
collected from the Build It, Break It, Fix It (BIBIFI) contests. A number of patterns of
developer mistakes leading to vulnerabilities were analyzed. Our work examined the software
development process in a real company. Our in-depth ethnographic study is complementary
to the analysis based on large-scale competition data. One possible cross-over between the
two types of studies is that one can use the insights from one to drive the analysis in the
other. For example, an observed real-world phenomenon that has significant security impact
could be replicated in the BIBIFI contest to further examine a hypothesis on a much larger
and more diverse population.
Oorschot and Wurster [63] posited that developers have different skills which often do
not include security and suggest that the focus should be on those who design APIs, because
it is unrealistic to expect all developers be taught sufficient security. We raise a similar
question in our paper from our ethnographic data, regarding how much security knowledge
developers can realistically master, and whether a co-creation model where security experts
and developers closely collaborate would be a more effective approach.
Green and Smith [64] discussed that developers are not the problem for insecure code.
The focus should be on creating more developer-friendly and developer-centric approaches
and supporting them when they are dealing with the security tasks. Our ethnographic data
supports this conclusion. Moreover, our fieldwork resulted in a co-creation model that could
be part of a solution to provide the needed support to developers for writing more secure
code.
In addition to the works mentioned above, the research community has explored this
area through a number of angles. Oliveira et al. [65] conducted surveys to understand de-
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velopers’ attitudes toward security which leads to understanding that APIs and tools can
be improved significantly. Votipka et al. [66] performed semi-structured interviews to compare how hackers and testers find vulnerabilities. Acar et al. [67] studied whether different
documentation resources influence the security of programmers’ code. Krombholz et al. [80]
performed a qualitative study with 30 users (18 end-users and 12 administrators) on user
mental models of HTTPS. Stransky et al. [81] designed an online platform to conduct online
secure-programming studies with remote developer participants. Naiakshina et al. [82] conducted a qualitative study with 20 computer science students and investigated how and why
they failed with regards to secure password storage. Gorski et al. [83] designed a controlled
online experiment with 53 participants to study the effectiveness of API-integrated security
advice. Their study showed that 73% of the participants who received the security advice
fixed their insecure code. Acar et al. [68] conducted an online study and evaluated five cryptographic APIs with GitHub Python developers about the usability of the crypto APIs. In
this study, they reported the simpler interfaces is not good enough and those crypto libraries
should also offer a broad range of common tasks support and provide accessible documentation with secure, easy-to-use code example. There has also been research that studied
and characterized different aspects of software bugs [84, 85, 86]. These studies focused on
the quality of bug reports and found that important information was often missing in bug
reports which made it harder to reproduce and fix them.
Going beyond secure software development, research into other aspects of usable security
has also revealed the importance of incorporating broader stake holders’ perspectives in
thinking about security solutions [87, 88]. Haney et al. studied the role of cybersecurity
advocates within organizations [89, 90, 91, 92]. Much of the findings in that line of research
echoes ours, in particular the importance of co-creating security solutions with relevant stake
holders.
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Chapter 9: Research Methods and Context

9.1

Methodology
A participant observation method was primarily used in this study [78, 79]. Anthropol-

ogists have developed this method as a way to study human behavior and cultures through
participating in daily activities and observing people’s behaviors over a long period of time
(usually more than a year). In addition to providing insights into the subjects’ activities,
knowledge, and habits, these activities enable researchers to gain a solid understanding of
a particular culture. Through adapting this approach to the context of working within a
software company, we can examine in depth the complexity of the software development
process, the various incentive structures among stakeholders that influence human behavior,
and the tight coupling between technical and human factors that affect software security.
In this research, the participant observers were two computer science PhD students, each
of whom underwent systematic training in qualitative research method under the guidance
of the anthropologist on our research team. Being CS students and possessing a substantial
amount of security knowledge enabled them to get quickly immersed into the company’s
software development process and start observing practices that might have an impact on
the software products’ security. Being inside the company enabled them to observe both
contemporary events as they unfolded, as well as past events studied through ticketing
systems and checking the relevant code in the repositories. The students’ role in the company
– working as if they were an employee of the company – helped with two important assets
of our research. First, their daily interactions with the developers while doing regular onthe-job tasks provided a unique angle to observe the subjects’ authentic behaviors as they
performed their job duties. Second, they not only acted as passive observers but as advocates
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of software security inside the company. This approach enabled the team to observe how
the various stakeholders reacted to discoveries of security vulnerabilities, providing valuable
insights into why those vulnerabilities were introduced in the first place and the constraints
under which they could be fixed (or not).
Each researcher worked at the company 20 hours a week, spread across three week-days.
The author of this dissertation worked there for six months, while the other researcher
worked there for a year. The researchers were not paid directly by the company. However, the company provided both financial and in-kind contributions to this research. In
general, the researchers’ tasks included debugging existing implementations to find bugs’
root causes, writing code fixes or implementing new features, performing code reviews, and
software quality assurance. The researchers took field notes about their observations, including both security issues found in the software and everyday interactions with developers
and other employees involved in the development process. Notes had two forms: descriptive
and insightful. Descriptive notes were intended to be as informative as possible, avoiding
personal judgments or opinions. Insightful notes aimed to capture “ah-ha” moments and
provide reflective analysis of the situations experienced by the observers.

9.2

Data Analysis
To derive research insights from the raw notes, we applied the general inductive ap-

proach [93], augmented by specific techniques for qualitative data analysis [94]. The initial
step was to find patterns that emerged directly from the data themselves. In this research,
the process happened via weekly meetings of the larger research team including both the
fieldworkers and the professors, where comparisons could be made across researchers, discussions could address both the human and technical dimensions of software development in
a company, and plans made for further exploration of interesting topics. Identifying themes
and links between ideas proved central to the inductive analysis, as well as developing contextual analysis around key examples. Data analysis continued through the coding of field
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notes based on identified themes. These codes included themes related to software security, human elements of the work, important explanatory concepts that emerged during the
research, and data linked to the key examples. A more detailed description of the coding
process as well as the “codebook” can be found in the Appendix D. Research meetings then
shifted to further developing our joint understanding of the data and identifying ways to
explain the observed patterns, as well as potential solutions to how human and technical
factors combined to shape (in)security.
It is important to highlight two unique aspects of our participant observation approach.
First, participant observation is often a solo affair in the social sciences; having two embedded
researchers permitted the examination of the company from two different but complementary
perspectives. The researchers were assigned different tasks, had slightly different hours at
the company, and developed relationships with company personnel at different points of
time. This dual approach to participant observation increases the robustness and validity of
the data from this research. Second, the research team consisted of experts in engineering
and social science. This multidisciplinary team participated with the embedded researchers
in developing the analysis over months, permitting the identification of themes and ideas
that crosscut disciplines and had both theoretical and applied dimensions. This team-based
approach to both data collection and analysis is a significant contribution to how this type
of research can be done effectively.

9.3

Context

9.3.1 The Company and Its Products
At the company, the researchers worked in the same space as four other developers, four
support engineers, two network engineers, one customer-facing on-boarding specialist, the
CTO, a marketing and sales manager, and other staff. The researchers’ work focused on
two products: a solution for controlling network access and a solution for allowing users
to securely access networks remotely. The solutions configured third-party network devices
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(e.g., routers and access-points), enforced operator-defined access-control policies, and managed remediation flows. Typical customers were medium- and large-size organizations, and
common users were IT staff who managed the organizations’ networks. Organization end
users attempting to connect to its network were prompted first by a captive portal that
asked for credentials. Once authenticated, they were asked to remediate any issues that
prevented them from complying with policy, e.g., they might be required to download and
run a client-side monitoring agent and update their anti-virus software.

9.3.2 Development Process
The company followed general agile development principles. The development team held
a scrum meeting every morning that lasted 15-30 minutes. In this meeting, each developer briefly commented about any progress accomplished or roadblocks encountered the day
before and discussed the plan-of-work for the current day. This was an opportunity for developers and managers to give and receive feedback from each other. The meeting was led
by the dev team
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lead. The CTO was usually in the room but did not lead the meeting.

Work was organized, prioritized, assigned, and tracked using ticketing and code management systems. In general, tickets were generated by developers, support techs, or customerfacing specialists, ranked in prioritization meetings held by the dev team lead and CTO, and
assigned and tracked by the dev team lead. After implementation, tasks were moved into the
peer-review stage in which other developers (often more experienced ones) reviewed any code
changes, added pending tasks if necessary, and finally approved merge requests. After code
changes were approved by all reviewers, tickets were reassigned for quality assurance and
integration testing, which was often done by both developers and support/customer-facing
specialists. When all tests had been passed, tickets were marked as “done” and merged into
the code repository’s development branch. When the set of target features for a release had
been implemented, the team lead created a release candidate branch. Every release candi9

dev team is short for “development team”
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date was tested in-house one last time before being finally moved into release and installed
on customer environments.

9.3.3 Study Participants
The main participants in the study were the four software engineers on the development
team where the student researchers were embedded. The dev team lead was an experienced
developer who had been at the company long-term and written many parts of the system.
Two of the other developers had been with the company for several years and another had
recently joined. One developer specialized in front-end development and two were full-stack
developers. The researchers also interacted with other personnel at the company, including
the CTO, via company meetings, work communications, and everyday activities such as
breaks and lunches where people often “talked shop” in informal ways.

9.3.4 Research Ethics
In our research, the employees of the company (developers, support techs, and managers)
were considered human subjects. The study was reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board (IRB). Researchers explained the study goals to participants and obtained
verbal informed consent from participants. Field notes were anonymized, as well as discussions during weekly research meetings. This part of the dissertation follows that same
anonymization approach. Throughout this part, I use the term application under study to
refer to a specific application in the company’s product suite. In addition, I anonymized all
product-specific terms in the following chapters as well.
One ethical dilemma that emerged during the research was what to do when security
vulnerabilities were discovered. Given ethical standards among cybersecurity professionals,
we made the decision to present these discoveries to the software development team. This
process proved crucial to the further development of the research. Rather than simply
observing what happened while continuing to work at the company, the researchers raised
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these security concerns, and where directed, actively worked on addressing them. This active
engagement led the research team to a co-creation model, where research, programming, and
security were all ongoing parts of what happened during the fieldwork.
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Chapter 10: Live Discovery through Pen-testing during Ethnography

10

This chapter describes how the author combined vulnerability discovery with par-

ticipant observation of developers’ behaviors and reactions. Unlike the other part of this
research (chapter 4 [58]), none of the pen-testing discovered vulnerabilities were intentionally introduced by developers, and as such the author had the opportunity to observe the
unfolding of developers’ reactions with the discovery of a totally unknown problem. It also
provided the opportunity for the author to intervene in a way that resulted in a co-creation
model, in which security experts work jointly with developers to improve code security issues
and prevent them from happening in future code.

10.1

Penetration Testing Method Adopted for This Study

Penetration testing, also known as pen-testing or ethical hacking, is an authorized simulated cyber-attack process against a computer system to reveal security flaws. The goal is
to identify weaknesses which might provide a passage for unauthorized users to gain access
and alter the integrity of the computer system. Pen-testing can be categorized as:
1. Black-box penetration testing: Auditors in a black-box test take on the role of an average hacker and have no intimate knowledge of the target system. Neither architecture
diagram nor source code is provided to testers that is not publicly accessible. A blackbox penetration test identifies the vulnerabilities in a system that can be exploited
from outside the network.
10

Some part of this chapter was published in proceedings of the Sixteenth Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security. Permission is included in Appendix A. [58]
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2. White-box penetration testing: White-box testing is referred to by several names,
including clear-box testing, open-box testing, auxiliary testing and logic-driven testing.
It is the exact opposite of black-box testing: auditors are given access to the source
code, architecture documents, etc. White-box testing is the most time consuming type
of penetration testing due to the difficulty of sifting through the massive amount of
data available to identify potential weaknesses.
3. Gray-box penetration testing: is in between the two previous categories. Grey-box
testers look at a system from the point of view of a user who may have more access
to the system than a black-box auditors does. In gray-box pen-testing, the auditor is
typically familiar with a network’s internals; they may have access to the network’s
design and architecture documents.
There are multiple software pen-testing methodologies, including the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) [95], Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual
(OSSTMM) [96], NIST SP 800-115 [97], Penetration Testing Execution Standard (PTES) [98],
and Information System Security Assessment Framework (ISSAF) [99]. Results vary based
on the way the process is performed.
Two of the company’s products were picked by the author for further study. By acquiring
some information and insights about the applications, the researcher started to apply a
customized penetration testing methodology. The basic information such as the software
workflow, authentication information, and so on was captured by talking with developers and
the support team. Both products were designed to work on a web platform, so OWASP’s top
ten security vulnerabilities [95] were chosen for the testing. At the same time as developing
the pen-testing process, the researcher worked to gain the developers’ trust. This process
required building rapport, an understanding with research informants, by participating in
daily tasks and getting to know individuals who worked there. The role of a security pentester also needed accurate planning and time management. “Code injection” was selected
for the first vulnerability to be tested. It is one of the well-known vulnerabilities which
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allows attackers to inject malicious codes into a computer system and change the course
of execution. The result of a successful injection can potentially be catastrophic. Before
we describe the pen-testing findings and developers’ reactions, we first briefly introduce the
three types of vulnerabilities found.

10.2

Exploring Software Vulnerabilities Found

1. Cross-site Scripting (XSS): generally found on web platforms. Attackers typically use
web applications to inject malicious codes into the application which can be viewed by
other users. There are three types of XSS: stored or persistent XSS, reflected XSS, and
DOM-based XSS. In stored XSS malicious code is stored permanently on the server
side of the web application. Reflected XSS is typically delivered to victims from other
routes such as e-mails and bounced back by the vulnerable web application. In DOMBased XSS or type-0 XSS attackers can modify the Document Object Model (DOM)
environment and inject malicious code.
2. HTML Injection: similar to XSS. However, instead of inserting malicious scripts, the attacker can inject valid HTML tags and modify the content of the target website. These
vulnerabilities are also categorized as stored HTML injection and reflected HTML injection. The main difference between these two types is that the stored HTML injection
is permanently stored inside the server side and executed every time a user accesses the
vulnerable page, whereas the reflected HTML injection payload must be delivered to
each victim separately (typically delivered via another route, such as email or malicious
links on another website) and it is not permanently stored on the server.
3. Shellcode Injection: also known as shellcode upload, a type of web vulnerability that
allows an attacker to inject malicious code into a system and provide the attacker a
shell on the system.This vulnerability lets an attacker take full control of the server
and technically works as a backdoor on that server.
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4. Remote Code Execution: is a category of software security flaws/vulnerabilities. Remote code execution (RCE) vulnerabilities will facilitate the execution of any code of
a malicious actor’s choice on a remote machine via LAN, WAN, or internet. RCE falls
under the broader category of arbitrary code execution (ACE) vulnerabilities.

10.3

Behaviors and Reactions from Developers

In the first day of pen-testing, I discovered an stored-XSS vulnerability in the application
being studied. The vulnerability was brought up to the developer team, and a proof of
concept was provided for why it was significant. While they showed interest in the finding,
since the vulnerability was in a 3rd-party application integrated with the company software,
their first reaction was to hope the problem had been fixed by the 3rd-party. One participant
said:
“This vulnerability belongs to our 3rd-party application, and we did not develop
this part. It is better to upgrade the software and see if we will still have the
issue”
They also mentioned that it would be more interesting if I could find any vulnerability
inside part of the company’s code. Thus, they expressed interest in security, but saw solving
this problem as the responsibility of an outside group even though the application formed
part of the company’s software.
In the next round of testing, I tried other parts of the software to see if there were any
other vulnerabilities. Multiple XSS vulnerabilities were found. Developers were both excited
and concerned about the findings. They said things like,
“If they want to test more, it seems that they will find more things inside our
software”
and
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“We tried to minimize our bugs, but it seems something is wrong.”
Once again,the third-party issue came up:
“We are using Angular, and I thought we shouldn’t have the XSS. Angular should
take care of this issue.”
A Remote Code Execution vulnerability was also found within the application. Attackers
were able to execute arbitrary code remotely on the same third-party application. Only
knowing the address of the platform is enough for attackers to execute their code. I provided
a proof-of-concept to the team. Due to the fact that this vulnerability found in the same
3rd-party application, one of the developer said again:
“...again this is on the X application. I hated to use this software inside our
application. We should create our own module for the Y task. Right now, just
try to upgrade it.”
On the same day, I found another vulnerability in the same application; this time it was
shellcode injection. The vulnerability allowed attackers to inject their customized shellcode
into a valid file and upload it into the server and get backdoor access with a powerful user’s
account on the server. The attacker must be someone who already had a regular account
inside the application web platform. The finding was interesting to the researcher team and
the developers for different reasons. For the research team, this was a critical vulnerability
– customers should never have escalated access to the server. They should only be able
to perform some limited commands on the OS such as changing the network IP address.
This essentially allows their customers to jail-break out of the sandbox set up on the server.
Developers on the other hand were more interested in understanding how access had been
gained. They said things like,
“Interesting! Could you show us how you got the access?”
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and
“What is your user’s privilege?”
At the same time, they discussed the risk in the context of the product,
“because we already ship the OS to the clients with everything inside it, it’s kind
of okay! They have the box already. ...We do not have any important information
on it.”
During the subsequent discussion with the developers, I asked, “Do you have any hardcoded password or credentials?” The answer was “yes.” This hard-coded credential would
allow a customer who successfully exploited the shellcode injection vulnerability to see other
customers’ information. Faced with this fact, the developers indicated that this vulnerability
was bigger than they originally thought, and that they should take imminent action on it.
However, that did not come to fruition at the next group meeting, where they continued to
talk about these vulnerabilities. Based on this discussion, the research team inferred that
there were other factors that affected the developers’ actions. In fact they said
“fixing the vulnerability has additional impacts and may cause some problems for
other parts of the application or customers.”
They also downplayed the significance of the shellcode injection vulnerability, and said that
the team should focus on developing new features. They added,
“If we want to fix every bug in our system, we will be out of business very soon.”
Contrary to the researcher team’s initial hope, our intervention effort to fix the discovered
security vulnerabilities proved ineffective in the context of the company’s overall functioning.
This moment helped me realize that I needed to rethink how security researchers engage
developers to create positive change.
It started by simply offering to work on the issue and building the tools and libraries
for them to prevent XSS. The bug was then fixed by me. One challenge I faced was that
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the application was uniquely designed and would only accept specific types of input entry
for the various fields. As a result, it was not possible for me to utilize standard input
sanitization solutions, e.g., one that removes all special characters, because that would break
the application. Working at the company and interacting with the developers helped me to
understand this uniqueness and come up with a customized solution. It was a number of
specially designed regular expressions that enforce the proper formats for the various types
of fields. I included the application of these regular expressions in a standalone Javascript
file that can be invoked at the front-end pages. It turned out that the company’s existing
code already contained a similar mechanism for checking other properties of front-end input
fields, e.g., if a field is empty. I only needed to extend this mechanism to include the regular
expression checks I designed for preventing XSS. Developers could then simply invoke these
checks in the same manner they had been doing for the other types of checks. This allowed
for easy integration of the security check into existing code with minimum change, and was
readily accepted by the development team. For back-end input sanitization, I first tried to
apply standard OWASP sanitization functions for Java, which was the language the backend was written in. However, due to the uniqueness of the formatting requirement of the
application, those standard checks were blocking some legitimate inputs. Thus I needed to
customize those OWASP functions to work properly with the application fields’ requirements.
During the fixing process, another XSS was found in the application. When the researcher
brought up the problem to the development team this time, they accepted it very fast. A
new ticket was created and the researcher was asked to fix the issue as soon as possible:
“...Go ahead and fix this bug as well.”
This example highlights the importance of “being there” for security experts to drive
positive change for secure coding. The researcher was able to accomplish this in this case
due to two factors: 1) he understood the company’s existing code and designed an effective
security check that minimized disruption; 2) he provided the needed security expertise in
designing the proper checks using regular expressions and the customization of the OWASP
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functions, and this expertise was delivered through code artifacts that were readily applicable
within the existing software workflow. Both factors were important for this success.
I tried later to bring up the shellcode injection vulnerability once more in a discussion
and tried to convince them to start fixing the issue, but the suggestion was turned down.
One of the developers responded,
“It’s somewhere in our backlog. We didn’t do anything about it, and no one has
found that exploit so far. So we are safe.”
This comment matched similar instances where developers reacted as though if there were no
problems at present, the vulnerabilities might not be an issue that needed urgent attention.
The research team considered a possible explanation why the shellcode injection vulnerability
was not treated as urgently as the XSS. Exploiting the shellcode injection vulnerability would
require a rogue player that can be held accountable (a customer’s IT staff member who
possessed the regular account access to the server). This may have alleviated the concern
on the company’s liability resulting from this vulnerability.
Later on in the research, an HTML injection was found inside a newly developed part
of the code. Like the XSS, the issue was brought up to the developers. Initially, developers
mentioned,
“Angular should cover it and not allow the HTML tag in the code! It seems it
does not.”
During the next group meeting, they recognized that they had omitted security issues previously. They said,
“When we discussed the development of the page, we talked about everything
except security and XSS problems. They didn’t come to our mind.”
At this time, the researcher thought that the developers would ask him to fix this issue like
in the XSS case, but they started to fix it by themselves and did not ask the researcher
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for any help. Most interestingly, the developers created correct solutions to fix the HTML
injection vulnerabilities, based on the way the researcher solved the XSS problem. This
showed that the developers learned from the researcher how to create security fixes within
their code base, without being explicitly taught so. They learned by simply observing the
code artifacts created by our researcher.
This is an example that illustrated the importance for security experts to be in the development environment and “co-create” security solutions with the developers. The difference
in the developers’ reactions in this case, compared to earlier ones, pushed the researchers to
realize that co-creation happens more in the moment, rather than trying to retroactively fix
things. Our earlier interventions mainly focused on fixing vulnerabilities found in code written in the past. We had success in getting some fixed (by the researcher). Whereas in this
case, the developers took their own actions and fixed the bugs using the knowledge and tools
provided to them by the researcher. This shows that if security professionals are present and
part of the team when a product is in the process of being designed and implemented, their
views are more likely to be taken into account when decisions about what to do are being
made. It was also the researcher’s feeling that the quickness with which the development
team accepted his suggestion to fix this issue was related to the increased level of trust he
enjoyed from the development team at this point in the research progress.
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Chapter 11: Analyzing the Findings

After initially finding the first bug in the pen-testing process, the researcher assumed
that developers did not know about these security problems, and lack of security knowledge
led them to write code with the vulnerabilities. After working with them on various tasks,
he realized that they actually possessed quite a bit of security knowledge. As our research
progressed, group discussions and analysis of field notes highlighted some non-intuitive reasons for developers’ behaviors. This indicates that there were other significant factors in
causing these vulnerabilities. I outline these factors in the rest of this section.

11.1

Developers Should Not Totally Trust Programming Languages

One of the important conversations that the researcher had with the developers was that
the developers believed that the programming language/framework should take care of some
vulnerabilities by default.
“...Angular should take care of this vulnerability...”
In this case and according to Angular documents [100], the Angular engine could handle
most of the XSS and HTML injection attack scenarios by sanitizing the input fields. Angular
documents also mentioned that developers need to take care of backend servers to make sure
injection vulnerabilities are not introduced there. After analyzing our field notes carefully,
we found that the developers believed (incorrectly) that Angular could handle all XSS and
HTML injection vulnerabilities.
In the past decade, programming languages and frameworks have been doing a great job
in creating built-in security measures to prevent accidental mistakes by developers, but they
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still do not offer a comprehensive security solution. From the developers’ point of view, it is
clear that these languages/frameworks do facilitate programming. This poses some questions
to the security and programming language community:
• How can developers know accurately where they can rely on language/framework and
where they must rely on their own code to achieve a security property?
• Can this be communicated in a way that does not require sophisticated knowledge on
all possible ways attack could happen?

11.2

Outsider vs. Insider

In the past, I worked as a pen-tester for four security consulting companies in three
countries for four years. In my experience, the pen-testers were not incorporated into the
development team. The developers might only receive a document with discovered vulnerabilities and statements about what they should or should not do. This appeared to be a
common industry approach to software security pen-testing [101]. The problem was that
the security pen-testers did not understand how much workload the developers had, nor
the actual reasons for the vulnerabilities. As a result, this approach did not often lead to
the desired changes in the development process, but set up an outsider/insider dynamic,
where developers felt the need to defend what they had done and/or minimize the security
issues. The developers would say that the report came from an outside group who did not
really understand how software development was done, and the security pen-testers would
say that the developers wrote defective code in the first place and did not appreciate security, otherwise they would have done something to fix all those problems. Having these
past experiences, in contrast with what I experienced in this research where I worked inside
the development team as a software pen-tester, helped the research team to understand the
impact the outsider/insider dynamic had on effectuating changes in software development
processes.
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From our fieldwork experience, we clearly see how this outsider/insider dynamic can play
out. When we first found the vulnerabilities about XSS, or code injections, the researcher’
initial thought was that the developers did not know about these security issues. However,
after researcher explained to developers and developers had clearly understood the technical
details, still some vulnerabilities were not fixed. It was only after further communication with
the developers, reflecting on other relevant observations made by the researcher, and brainstorming among the larger research team, that we better recognized why some vulnerabilities
were not prioritized to be fixed. Most importantly, it is when we had this understanding,
and produced an easy-to-apply solution that fit into the company’s development workflow,
that our intervention was the most successful.
The point of view that if developers know better and work harder, they should be able
to write software without any security flaws, can be characterized as the so-called “deficit
model,” where the problem of software insecurity is attributed to the developers’ lack of
knowledge or efforts. The solution driven by this deficit model would mainly involve experts
explaining to developers the various software security issues and how to prevent them, and
hoping this would drive the needed changes. Research in fields such as education, anthropology, and science communication have examined how using such a deficit model does not
prove as useful as imagined because it localizes the problem inside the person and assumes
that simply fixing that internal lack will also successfully address larger concerns such as
successful learning, cross-cultural understanding, and the application of science to at times
controversial topics [102, 103, 104]. One analytic concept of note that emerged through the
research was our own use of a “deficit model” to initially interpret why people in the company
did not respond to security concerns. We assumed that they might not have the knowledge
or awareness to understand security risks and recognize how and why particular aspects of
the software might increase those risks. Our research found that this deficit model-driven
approach was not working well. Simply communicating security issues found and presenting
solutions for fixing them did not lead to the anticipated fixes.
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Overcoming this “deficit model” in our own thinking helped us to better interpret why
participants responded or not to security issues and to recognize how security concerns
existed alongside other factors that shaped their work. We then developed a co-creation
model, where developers and security experts collaborate together. Co-creation is a form
of collaboration in which ideas and processes are shared and improved together rather than
kept to only one-party side. By having a co-creation model, security auditors have the chance
to jump into the development process and provide the knowledge and tools that developers
can readily apply to prevent vulnerabilities. Part of this co-creation model meant that the
researcher did not work exclusively on security but dealt with different tickets. This showed
the developers that the researcher knew how to program, and could do so as part of a team,
while also having expertise in security that he could draw on if needed.
It appeared to us that developers prefer to trust a person inside their team rather than an
outsider. Moreover, our field notes showed that a security person inside the developer team
can provide more in-depth knowledge than outside resources such as pen-testing reports,
internet, and so on. For example, after the XSS got fixed on the application under study,
when developers faced the HTML injection they said:
“Is this HTML Injection going to be easy to fix? It should be very easy to fix...”
and without asking the researcher to provide the solution for them, they fixed the issue.

11.3

Thinking as an Attacker, Thinking as a Developer

It has almost become a platitude in the security field that one must “think as an attacker.”
This idea can be traced back to the well-known statement attributed to the ancient Chinese
military expert Sun Tzu:
“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles.”
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Applying this to software development, the developers can put themselves in the attackers’
shoes and understand how software may be misused. It is an interesting question as to how
much developers need to think as an attacker. These days, understanding the mechanisms of
all types of cyber attacks can be overwhelming even to a security expert. Our data implied
that the developers and the company were aware of some of those threats that they may face,
but just knowing them was not enough. The problem is not necessarily about the lack of
understanding the attackers; it is more about not being able to implement security features
correctly into software, which unfortunately requires some non-trivial amount of security
knowledge. Is it realistic to expect all software developers to become security experts?
How much time should developers spend on thinking about how their code may be attacked,
among all the other competing demands they face? Security professionals can help bridge this
gap by starting to think like developers, just like how we ask developers to think like attackers.
Security professionals need to better understand how developers have to negotiate many
competing interests, not just a sole focus on security. This could help in providing security
knowledge and information at the right level of abstraction that can be easily integrated into
the software development process. The co-creation model we used as part of this research
allowed the security researchers to think like a developer, and to create some positive impacts
in the software development process.
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Chapter 12: Conclusion and Future Work

This part of this dissertation, shows how security intersects with software development on
the ground, based on a embedded researcher with six months’ data. Our study has revealed
two factors that play a part in determining how much security advice can be taken: “Security
considerations need to come early in the development life cycle”. In the case of code injection,
we didn’t get to be there when the features were developed. Because of this, we could not
successfully intervene. We believe that if we were there at the time, we might have been
able to fix this bug. Just as the other vulnerability I presented in section 10.3 , with which
developers have successfully fixed the HTML Injection after I introduced it to them without
asking me to fix it. Moreover, we highlighted that “Security experts can be more effective
when they work within a development team.” As I mentioned before, as a penetration tester,
I have worked in multiple companies and from my experience, the security people are not
incorporated into the development process. However, in this study when I stepped into the
role of a security worker in the team, we realized that we could be a lot more helpful if we
intervened as team members. This conclusion is confirmed by the success of interventions
with XSS injections vulnerability we had in our research. There remains a considerable gap
between security and developers. Our research shows that security professionals can better
bridge the gap by understanding how (in)security emerges from the interacting technological
and human factors in the development process. Our ethnographic study provided a way
to understand this complicated phenomenon, both by better understanding the competing
demands under which developers work, and by demonstrating how security can successfully
be integrated into software development through a co-creation model.
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[101] Michael Felderer, Matthias Búchler, Martin Johns, Achim D Brucker, Ruth Breu, and
Alexander Pretschner. Security testing: A survey. Advances in Computers, 101:1–51,
2016.
[102] Hee-Je Bak. Education and public attitudes toward science: Implications for the
“deficit model” of education and support for science and technology. Social Science
Quarterly, 82(4):779–795, 2001.
[103] Susan D Blum. Why don’t anthropologists care about learning (or education or
school)? an immodest proposal for an integrative anthropology of learning whose time
has finally come. American Anthropologist, 121(3):641–654, 2019.
[104] Tom Humphries. Schooling in American sign language: A paradigm shift from a deficit
model to a bilingual model in deaf education. Berkeley Review of Education, 4(1):7–33,
2013.

89

Appendix A: Copyright Permissions

Copyright permission for content used in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 can be seen below.
The publishers state that authors can reuse any portion of their own work in a new work of
their own (and no fee is expected) as long as a citation and DOI pointer to the Version of
Record in the ACM Digital Library are included.

90

Copyright permission for content used in Chapters 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 can be seen below.
The publishers state that the authors own the copyright of the content published in the
paper.

91
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This research involves study of human subjects and the researchers have obtained approval from IRB to conduct this research. The documentation for the approval is shown
below.

Figure B.1: IRB Approval
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Appendix C: Clusters Identified from Honeypot Logs

We will take a look at the commands found inside each cluster in this appendix.
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Appendix D: Coding

Coding – including the development of specific codes and of a codebook – proceeded in
an iterative fashion. Weekly meetings facilitated the discussion of emerging research themes
and specific examples. Codes emerged from these discussions, where the researchers built
consensus on specific analyses. The researchers relied on a general inductive approach [93], as
well as techniques derived from grounded theory and related approaches for doing qualitative
analysis [94]. Overall, the development of codes initially focused on the Silently Allow
example (The researcher 1), then on emerging results from penetration testing (the author
of this dissertation), the development of a specific coding system for each researcher for their
field notes, and a final collaborative phase to find commonalities in codes for both the specific
examples and overall corpus of field notes.

D.1

Full Set of Codes

Subsequent research focused on developing a full set of codes by each of the researchers.
Because the two embedded researchers often worked on different projects and at different
times, each wrote their own field notes and then subsequently engaged in coding of their
own notes. This process permitted inductive analysis from their own data, which could then
be shared in research meetings to produce consensus. Listed below are the sets of codes
developed by the author of this dissertation:
• Caring-about-subject
• Changing-attitude
• Development-process
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• Documents-not-updating-frequently
• Fix-first-update-later
• Joking-about-intern-work
• Knowing-bug-do-nothing
• Lack-of-knowledge
• Learning-process-with-company
• Looking-for-new-idea
• New-idea-vs-tasks
• Not-caring-about-subject
• Not-trusting-other-developer-or-intern
• Performance-reaction
• Protective-about-subject
• Say-something-do-something-else
• Security-vs-performance
• Security-vulnerabilities-blocked
• Security-vulnerabilities-concern
• Security-vulnerabilities-denying
• Security-vulnerabilities-execution
• Security-vulnerabilities-fixing
• Security-vulnerabilities-interested
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• Security-vulnerabilities-process
• Security-vulnerabilities-reaction
• Security-vulnerabilities-thinking
• Security-vulnerabilities-upgrading
D.2

Final Collaborative Phase

Researchers often worked on a whiteboard during the final collaborative phase of a project
to find the overlap between different types of data, specific examples, and inductive conclusions. For example, when working through the data to find common themes and observations
in both field notes and in the researchers’ experience during participant observation, the idea
of “co-creation” emerged as an overarching conclusion. Upon reviewing the similarities, via
the coding and then the notes, we were also able to make data-driven conclusions about what
was successful and what appeared to be bottlenecks or limitations throughout the months
of embedded research.
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